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ABSTRACT
Between 1996 and 1999 the British Columbia (BC) government adopted 
a transgovernmental stance to pressure Ottawa and the United 
States into renegotiating the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) . BC' s 
stance on this issue defied federal primacy over international 
affairs and ocean fisheries, and created tension between Victoria 
and Ottawa. This thesis demonstrates that BC's stance can be 
explained in part by two factors: "confidence" (specifically, 
decreased provincial confidence in Ottawa's ability to manage the 
salmon fishery) and "interest" (specifically, increased provincial 
interest in salmon). These factors are consistent with existing 
theoretical explanations for provincial transgovernmental 
activity. The research also suggests two other factors - 
political context and symbolism - influenced BC' s stance. 
"Political context" involves the Clark government's desire to 
divert public attention away from negative issues affecting it in 
non-fishery areas. "Symbolism" involves associations between fish 
and the provincial identity. This study thereby demonstrates the 
validity of contemporary explanations for provincial 
transgovernmental behaviour, and exposes a need for the existing 
theory to be modified to include added factors.
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CHAPTER 1 -  INTRODUCTION
FUGITIVE RESOURCES
Pacific Salmon are a "fugitive resource." This term refers to 
those natural resources for which it is difficult to assign 
ownership because they ignore social and political jurisdictions 
and boundaries.' As a result of these proprietal uncertainties, 
such resources tend (by default) ro be held in common rather than 
as private property. In the absence of clearly defined ownership 
rules, though, fugirive resources are subject to the pitfalls 
associated with "open access" or "common property" resources.'
As is explained below, this creates the potential for 
overexDloiration to occur.
In economic terms, common property resources are 
those resources for which property rights are nor 
clearly defined so that an individual cannot exclude 
other users (non-exclusive) and the use of the 
resource by one person prevents the use by another 
(rival). The common property dilemma hinges on rhe 
recognition thar when more than one individual has 
access to the resource that individual is able to 
obtain benefit while the collective bears the cost .. 
the individual benefit is greater than the 
individual cost which provides incentive for 
individuals to overexploit resources held in 
common.'
Avoiding the aforementioned drawbacks associated with fugitive 
resources requires that affected jurisdictions cooperate to apply 
mutually agreeable, binding social enforcement mechanisms that 
recognize each country's proprietal rights and interests. This 
typically involves treaties or other formal sharing arrangements.
since ir encompasses proprietal concerns extending across user 
jurisdictions, the Pacific salmon resource exemplifies these 
issues surrounding the management of fugitive resources. These 
aspects of the fishery will now be addressed.
INTERMATIONAL ASPECTS OF PACIFIC SALMON
Pacific salmon’ adhere to a remarkably complex life cycle and 
are am.ong the world's most migratory fish species.' They begin 
their lives having emerged from eggs deposited on the gravel­
laden bottom of inland rivers, lakes, and streams, and reside in 
this freshwater environment for anywhere from several weeks to 
two years, depending on the species. During this time the 
juvenile fish feed and grow rapidly, all to attain the strength 
and vigour needed to progress into the next stage of their life 
cycle - migration to the open ocean. Those salmon that 
successfully navigate the complex network of inland waterways 
leading to the Pacific Ocean often cover several hundred 
kilometres ever the course of their journey. Upon reaching the 
ocean they converge around river deltas and remain in a holding 
pattern for several weeks while adapting their physiology to the 
saline environment.' Once they are capable of withstanding full- 
strength seawater, and having achieved a threshold size, the 
salmon progress further out into the Pacific. Eventually they 
disperse and wander broadly, partaking in long migrations through 
the open ocean. They typically move northward into the Gulf of
Alaska (but some travel as far as the Bering Sea). The salmon 
spend the next several years of their lives in this ocean 
environment, constantly feeding, growing, and otherwise maturing 
into adults.
Two to five years after entering the open ocean the salmon 
again form dense schools in preparation for the long journey back 
to the mainland. Almost unerringly they follow their previous 
migratory route. They travel to the coast and gather around the 
river mouths from which they once emerged. Eventually the salmon 
reacclimatize their physiology to freshwater, and then progress 
up the rivers and tributaries that lead to their specific natal 
stream. Upon reaching their destination they reproduce and die, 
thereby completing the salmon life cycle. This migration pattern 
- as it relates to the American states and to the province of 
British Columbia - is illustrated in Maps 1 and 2 of Appendix A.
Commercial fisheries in both Canadian and American 
jurisdictional waters annually target the vast groups of salmon 
as they migrare through the open ocean towards their natal 
rivers. These fisheries are based in the states of Alaska, 
Washington and Oregon, and in the province of BC, and have long 
assumed important economic and cultural' roles within each of 
these jurisdictions. However, because salmon migrate through 
each country's territorial waters, and because fish stocks 
intermingle extensively with one another, there exists the
possibility that fisheries conducted in one nation's waters will 
catch salmon originating in and returning to the other nation's 
rivers. These are referred to as "interceptions"
Interceptions create a serious impediment to the management of 
the salmon resource. It is difficult to justify domestic efforts 
to increase production and preserve the resource when the 
benefits of such efforts are subject to the uncontrollable 
harvests of fisheries in another country." Moreover, 
interceptions contradict the "nation of origin" principle as 
spelled out in the United Nations Third Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 66(1). This principle asserts property 
rights over the fish by declaring "states in whose rivers 
anadromcus stocks originate shall have the primary interest and 
responsibility for such stocks.""'
In the case of Pacific salmon, cooperation in this manner is 
encouraged by UNCLOS. This implies transboundary fishery 
resources should be managed by international treaty 
organizations.'" Thus, international legal norms and the 
proprietal nature of the fishery resource compel both the United 
States and Canada to adopt a cooperative and coordinated approach 
to managing their salmon stocks. In this context, the PST of 
1985 I to be explained below) was the most recent in a series of 
formal agreements between the two nations aimed at facilitating a 
mutually beneficial salmon fisheries regime.
HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY
Initial bilateral cooperation on the management of Pacific 
salmon fisheries originated in the early 20th century. In 1913 
construction crews working on the Canadian Pacific Railway route 
mistakenly blasted too much rock from a section of the Fraser 
Canyon known as "Hell's Gate."'" The resulting massive rockslide 
blocked all fish passage up and down river and ultimately reduced 
the take of pink and sockeye salmon for Canadian and American 
fishers. Authorities from both nations subsequently agreed that 
all costs relating to the restoration of these runs would be 
split on a 50-50 basis, and that the catch of salmon would also 
be shared equally. Restoration work was initiated and, by 1918, 
the flow of the Fraser River was restored.
This theme of cooperation subsequently led the two countries 
into formal negotiations over a long-term treaty. The 
negotiations extended well over two decades. Eventually, in 
1937, the Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and 
Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fishery of the Fraser River 
System was signed."' This treaty allocated each nation 50- of 
Fraser River sockeye caught in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, 
northern Puget Sound, the Strait of Georgia, and off the west 
coast of Vancouver Island. It also prescribed bilateral 
cooperation on projects aimed at restoring and enhancing the 
salmon stocks. To oversee the implementation of these objectives 
the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission (IPSFC) was
esrablished. As a result, both nations experienced three decades 
of "relative tranquillity' in their relations pertaining to 
Pacific salmon.
Despite the cordiality of fishery relations over the decades 
following the 1937 agreement, it eventually became apparent that 
"a much broader forum was necessary to solve the overall problem 
of Canadian and US salmon interceptions."'" Consequently, in 1970 
the two governments agreed to a "Reciprocal Fishing Accord" which 
called for negotiations "regarding all matters of mutual concern 
related to the fisheries for Pacific Salmon." ' ' Twelve years 
later a draft agreement was achieved." However, Alaska opposed 
the draft agreement, claiming it would place "unreasonable 
limitations" on Alaska's sockeye and pink salmon fisheries . Due 
to these objections the treaty did not come to a vote on the 
floor of the US Senate.” However, by December 1984, .Alaska had 
been persuaded"" to accept a revised version of the draft, and the 
following spring the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) was signed by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney during their 
Shamrock Summit.'"
The PST of 1985 expanded the terms of its predecessor by 
incorporating into its regulatory mandate all salmon species from 
fish-producing rivers between .Alaska and Oregon. The objectives 
of the PST were centered around two core principles - 
conservation and equity."’ The conservation principle aimed to
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ensure that each nation conducted its fisheries in a manner that 
prevented over fishing while at the same time providing for 
optimum production of the salmon resource."" The equity principle 
was predicated on the UNCLOS principles pertaining to anadromcus 
fish species, and sought to guarantee each nation an allocation 
of salmon equivalent to the production of fish originating in its 
own waters." The PST also established the Pacific Salmon 
Commission - consisting of two national sections, each with four 
appointed commissioners - as its principal decision-making body, 
and charged it with the task of overseeing the implementation of 
the Treaty's core principles over six specific fisheries."" To 
assist the Commission in realizing these objectives three 
regional panels and five joint technical committees were 
founded."' Each nation submitted to the panels annual reports 
regarding their domestic fisheries, and this dara assisted its 
members in scientifically assessing each fishery and presenting 
advice to the Commission for annual fishing regimes. The 
Commission subsequently devised quotas as to where, when, how, 
and how m.uch each country's fishers could harvest.
From the beginning, the PST's equity principle remained a 
point of contention between the two nations. On one hand, the 
Canadians argued that "only the State of Origin can protect and 
culture salmon and effectively manage the fishery," and, 
therefore, the country of origin should be recompensed for salmon 
spawned in its rivers but harvested by the other country's
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fishers.' This position echoed provisions of UNCLOS which imply 
ownership of anadromous fish species, and reflected the need rc 
ensure that the nation making sacrifices and spending money to 
conserve its salmon stocks could avail itself of the benefits of 
such e f f o r t s . I n  this context, Canadian negotiators proposed 
the implementation of a specific accounting formula that 
interpreted equity on a fish-for-fish basis (essentially, that US 
interceptions of Canadian fish should be equally matched by 
Canadian interceptions of US fish). The Americans, however, saw 
this as an "oversimplification""'' and were insistent that another 
aspect of the Law of the Sea also be reflected in the PST, 
specifically that a nation of origin must "cooperate in 
minimizing economic dislocation in such other States fishing 
these stocks, taking into account the normal catch and the mode 
of operations of such States, and all the areas which such 
fishing has occurred."" In this context, it was clear that the 
United States i and specifically Alaska) was not prepared to 
accept a formula that would "whittle away American fisheries that 
harvested Canadian-origin salmon."
As a result of the competing interpretations of the equity 
principle, the two parties were unable tc come to agreement. 
However, they were determined that this difference of opinion 
would not prevent the achievement of a final sharing agreement. 
Thus, in order tc avoid dealing with this divisive issue 
immediately, it was simply decided "more accurate scientific
information was required before there could be reliable data on 
interceptionsConsequently, a Memorandum of Understanding was 
attached to the PST specifying that research on the migratory 
movements of stocks subject to interception would be "continued 
for several years."" If it was determined during the period that 
this research was conducted that "one country or the other is 
deriving substantially greater benefits than those provided from 
its rivers," the Commission expected that "the parties would 
develop a phased program to eliminate the inequity within a 
specified time period."' Any such program, however, would have 
to take into account Article III, Paragraph 3 of the PST, which 
declares that the goal of reducing interceptions must be achieved 
in a manner that avoids "the undue disruption of existing 
fisheries.""' In the meantime, a set of management plans for each 
fishing region was attached to the PST via a series of Annexes 
covering four-and-eight year time periods ior one to two life 
cycles of salmon). For the most part these Annexes only provided 
for the "maintenance of existing states of interceptions with 
some reductions for conservation purposes,"' implying that the 
Commission would only assist the two parties in negotiating new 
harvest limits and allocations of interceptions before the 
original Annexes expired.Therefore, the existing PST did not 
offer clear assurances that a definitive resolution to the equity 
issue would be forthcoming.
PST: IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
At first, as rhe original Annexes began to expire in 1989, the 
two countries finessed the annual fishing regimes while 
negotiations over the equity principle continued.’- During these 
negotiations they continued to adhere to their original 
arguments, with the Canadians insisting equity be determined on a 
fish-for-fish basis, and the Americans (and specifically the 
Alaskans) insisting that any resolution must not result in the 
"undue disruption of existing fisheries."’' Indeed, given that 
Alaska's fisheries were now approaching annual interceptions 
levels of Canadian salmon estimated to be worth $62 million,’' the 
state had little incentive to cooperate with Canada on any plan 
that would reduce its economic share of the resource. 
Consequently, by 1993, no new annual fishing allocations were 
negotiated.
Over the short term Canada's federal government and 
representatives from BC's fisheries Ministry worked cooperatively 
tc address the Americans' inflexibility on the PST issue. They 
employed a variety of methods to break the impasse, including 
remedial discussions, much political gesturing, and mediation. 
None were successful, and cooperation between Canada's levels of 
government began to weaken. For reasons to be explained below,
BC's confidence in Ottawa's ability to address west coast fishery
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issues and deal with the American's inflexible stance on the PST 
proceeded to dwindle and, as a result, relations became strained.
PROVINCIAL ACTIVISM ON THE PST
In 1995, BC Premier Glen Clark adopted unilateral measures 
aimed at bringing the Americans into compliance with (Canada's 
interpretation of) the terms of the PST. The most notable of 
these actions involved the threatened cancellation of an American 
lease of provincial land for the Nanoose Bay torpedo testing 
range. Such action by the province marked the transition from a 
jurisdictionally-cooperative and coordinated approach on the PST 
problem, to a more confrontational, independent, and executive- 
led provincial stance that flouted Ottawa's jurisdictional 
authority. In response to the province's autonomous stance, 
Ottawa rebuked Clark's tactics. The premier, however, continued 
his defiant campaign, offering only a further barrage of 
criticism of federal fisheries policy. As a consequence, 
relations between the two levels of governments quickly soured.
The province's aggressive stance on the PST ultimately proved 
fruitless. As it turned out, Ottawa not only entirely excluded 
Clark's representatives from negotiations, but also expropriated 
the provincially owned land at the Nanoose facility, thereby 
removing the province's primary point of leverage against the 
Americans. With the Clark government's ability to sabre-rattle 
constrained, the federal government went on to negotiate -
II
without provincial input - a new treaty agreement based on the 
existing terms of the PST.’' Thus ended the tensions between the 
federal and provincial governments and BC's "fish war" of the 
1990s.
By directly engaging the Americans on this issue, and thus 
"going international"'*' with its fisheries policy, the province 
delivered a blatant challenge to Ottawa's primacy over 
international relations and ocean fisheries.* But what are the 
origins of this instance of provincial " transgovernmentalism" ?'* 
Specifically, what factors led the province to defy federal 
primacy in international affairs by unilaterally charting an 
independent course of action on the PST? Is it possible to 
locate these factors within the broader theoretical of 
transgovernmentalism? This thesis seeks to answer these 
questions and assess the Clark government's behaviour in light cf 
various explanatory factors regarding sources of provincial 
transgovernmentalism. It subsequently verifies that declined 
provincial confidence in federal fisheries policy and increased 
provincial interest in salmon were the major factors influencing 
BC's stance on the PST, and confirms that these factors 
correspond accurately with existing theories of such activity. 
This process also reveals that other factors, namely politics and 
symbolism, were important in shaping BC's stance on the treaty. 
The methods by which this will occur are spelled out below.
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THESIS METHODS
This thesis examines the series of events surrounding a decision 
or action occurring within a public policy context, and may be 
therefore classified as a "process case study.'' The 
circumstances and events leading to Glen Clark's decision to take 
independent international action (between 1996 and 1999) on the 
matter of the stalled PST are examined in detail. This case was 
selected because it represents an instance of the political 
concept known as "transgovernmentalism," which refers to 
international activity on behalf of sub national units. As such, 
it offers an opportunity to test the validity of existing 
explanations for such behaviour.
The core questions to be answered in this analysis are :
1. What specific factors prompted BC tc reject Ottawa's 
primacy over international affairs and to chart its own 
course of action on the PST issue?
2. How do the province's motivations and behaviour correspond 
to explanatory factors of transgovernmental activism?
3. Are there any other factors influencing the province's 
stance that are not identified by the existing theory?
As will be demonstrated below, there are two major factors at 
play in EC's fisheries policy during the period in question. The 
dependent variable is Premier Glen Clark's transgovernmental 
approach to the PST impasse. The two independent factors that
are asserted to explain the Clark government's transgovernmental 
behaviour are:
1. provincial "interest" in the salmon fishery;
2. provincial "confidence" pertaining to Ottawa's ability tc 
manage the west coast salmon fishery.
It will be shown that these two factors largely explain the Clark 
government's interpretation the PST problem as an issue worthy of 
aggressive, transgovernmental action.
In the early to mid 1990s the NDP government implemented an 
extensive set of environmental reforms throughout various sectors 
of the province. Many of these reforms impacted favorably on, 
and represented considerable investment in, the federally- 
controlled Pacific salmon resource, and thereby amounted to an 
increased "provincial interest" in the fishery. Occurring 
simultaneously to the implementation of this environmental 
protection regime was a significant reduction of provincially- 
held confidence regarding Ottawa's ability tc manage both the 
domestic and international aspects of the Pacific salmon 
resource. Ottawa's failure to resolve the issue of the stalled 
PST agreement and thereby end American over fishing of Canadian 
salmon was a key factor. When Glen Clark became Premier in 1996, 
these above circumstances laid the groundwork for provincial 
transgovernmental action aimed at resolving the salmon treaty 
issue. In essence, by directly challenging the Americans on the
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PST issue (and rhereby rejecting federal primacy over ocean 
fisheries) the Clark government envisioned that it could protec 
provincial interests in the salmon resource and address its 
declined confidence in Ottawa's ability to manage the fishery. 
This initial working hypothesis is represented in Figure 1 :
Figure 1 - WORKING HYPOTHESIS
I n p u t ;  I n d e p e n d e n t  F a c t o r s O u t p u t :  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e
B C ’s
P OL I CY
The relationship between the input and output factors is 
analyzed through a narrative process’ that e:-:amines the relevant 
circumstances and events that occurred over the years leading up 
to and including the time period in question (1996-99i. In order 
to heighten the accuracy of the observations contained herein, a 
variety of empirical and qualitative data are used to determine 
the relationships between the independent factors and the 
province's stance on the PST (the dependent variable). These
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data include both primary and secondary information, such as that 
derived from government documents, media coverage, academic 
literature, and interviews with informed observers (i.e.: 
academics) and relevant individuals (i.e. politicians). This 
comprehensive'-' process will not only enhance the reliability of 
the observations and conclusions made herein; it will also assist 
in identifying, in the end, whether or not any other factors were 
influencing EC's fisheries policy. The layout of this thesis is 
explained below.
THESIS LAYOUT
This chapter, the Introduction, spells out the international 
aspects of the Pacific salmon fishery (a fugitive resourcei and 
addressed the history of cooperation between Canada and the 
United States on managing the salmon resource (cooperation that 
ultimately led to the development of the PST in 1985). It alsc 
covers the implementation problems associated with the PST, and 
outlined the transgovernmental actions BC eventually took in 
order to resolve the impasse surrounding the Treaty. The chapter 
closes by e:-:plaining the working hypothesis and the methodology 
that will be applied in order to account for EC's stance.
Chapter Two reviews the theoretical literature regarding 
sources of provincial international activity. It identifies 
"confidence" and "interest" as important determinants of 
provincial transgovernmental behavior.
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chapter Three introduces the 1 ’ independent factor - 
provincial interest. It details the process whereby a provincial 
environmental protection regin i was established and how this 
subsequently increased "provincial interest" in the salmon issue.
Chapter Four introduces the 2'“^ independent factor - provincial 
confidence. It details the process whereby BC's confidence in 
Ottawa's ability to manage the domestic and international aspects 
of the west coast salmon fishery declined significantly.
Chapter Five characterizes the dependent variable - BC's 
aggressive transgovernmental policy on the PST. It describes the 
process whereby the interaction of the two independent factors 
influenced the NDP premier to take charge of and propel what had 
been BC's jurisdictionally cooperative fisheries policy into a 
more independent, confrontational and transgovernmental 
direction.
Chapter Si:-: clarifies that increased "interest" and declined 
"confidence" were in fact the core motivation behind BC's e:-:tra- 
national pursuit of the PST issue. However, it also identifies 
the role other factors - namely political conte:-:t and 
symbolism/culture - assumed in shaping BC's fisheries policy.
The chapter finds that the e:<planatory power of e:-:isting theory 
on the sources of transgovernmental activity remains intact, but 
that the theory is in need of refinement in a manner that
17
accommodates factors relating to political context and 
symbolism/culture.
Chapter Seven is the conclusion. It includes a revised model 
of tne original working hypothesis.
The end of the document consists of Appendix A (maps), 
Appendix B (interview documentation), and endnotes.
18
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW
Why should students of international politics be interested in 
BC's policy on the PST? One answer is that the management of 
fugitive resources such as salmon can be a perplexing task for 
politicians. As a result, it is important to understand the roles 
that affected jurisdictions - both national and sub national - 
assume in shaping policies pertaining to such resources. Another 
answer is that BC's attempts to forge an independent role in 
determining the outcome of the PST issue constitute an instance of 
provincial transgovernmentalism. It is this aspect of EC's stance 
on the PST that is the primary motivation for this study.
This chapter will survey the literature pertaining to the 
sources of provincial transgovernmentalism. This survey places 
the Clark government's fisheries policy in a theoretical context 
and provides the foundation for concluding that the motivations 
for its transgovernmental stance largely conform to existing 
explanations.
TBANSGOVERNMENTALISM IN THEORY
Transgovernmentalism refers to "activity abroad conducted by 
the constituent governments of a federal union or subunits of a 
central government."'' For the most part, provincial 
transgovernmental activity encompasses only "mundane" issues 
relating to "low level" politics which have "few if any diplomatic
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implications." ’ Consequently, transgovernmentalism is "scarcely 
perceived as international affairs at all."'' Moreover, in those 
instances where there are distinct and important provincial 
concerns to be heeded, provincial authorities typically pursue 
their efforts in concert with the federal government, and Ottawa 
makes effective use of a variety of strategies aimed at 
accommodating such concerns while underlining its role as the main 
formulator of national foreign policy.'" Thus, when undertaking 
transgovernmental activity, it is typical for the provinces to 
"implicitly or explicitly recognize federal pre-eminence in the 
making of Canadian foreign policy,"-' and to adhere to the 
"political consensus"" regarding central government authority in 
this sector. In this sense, most provincial international 
behavior conforms with arguments for federal primacy over external 
affairs. " '
There nevertheless exists a discernable measure of provincial 
international activity that conflicts with federal foreign policy 
prerogatives and, therefore, conflicts with widely-held notions 
that central governments should be the dominant actors in 
relations among and between sovereign states. Indeed, over the 
course of Canadian history, there have been several cases of 
federal-provincial conflict over foreign policy. Some of the more 
renowned instances are the Labour Convention case ' in the 1930s, 
and BC's efforts in the 1950s to develop the Columbia River."' The
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Clark government:' s stance on the PST issue is another example in 
this context.
Elliot Feldman and Lily Gardner-Feldman note that provincial 
international activity challenges "conventional concepts of 
sovereignty and the federal view of a national monopoly in the 
field of foreign policy/'and therefore equates to a "pattern of 
behavior deviating from the accepted norms."'" This "involvement 
of domestic constituents in the foreign policy-making process'"' 
contributes to a "blurring of distinctions"" between the otherwise 
discrete domestic and international policy fields. Essentially, 
sub-national units do not easily fit into the usual "typologies 
employed when analyzing the complexities of international 
relations."' Moreover, this uncertainty has "plagued observers 
and practitioners of foreign affairs for generations.'"' As a 
result, students of foreign affairs "have not yet apprehended the 
political significance" of such activity, nor have they provided 
"adequate theory to explain their emergence, categorize their 
present condition, or predict their future direction."'' Thus, tc 
be certain, there remains a continuing need to investigate the 
forces that compel provinces to reject federal primacy and project 
themselves autonomously at the international level.
INCREASING PROVINCIAL INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM
In recent years, areas under provincial control have achieved 
heightened international significance. As Roff Johannson states,
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"Che fields over which the provinces have partial or total 
jurisdiction have come to occupy an increasing place on the 
international agenda," and, in many instances, the "international 
environment has pushed subjects under provincial jurisdiction into 
the international limelight' As a result of the increased 
provincial stake in the realm of foreign affairs, jurisdictional 
exclusion of the provinces from the area of international 
relations has become "of little importance." ' There has emerged a 
"widespread expectation that it is right and proper for 
governments that might be otherwise technically barred to be 
involved." '
As provincial interests are more frequently affected by the 
vagaries of the international system, the provinces have developed 
an "enhanced concern with the foreign dimensions of public 
policy." ' In fact, "domestic interests and their elected 
representatives are becoming more directly involved in the 
formulation of foreign policy decisions." ’ They now "assume 
greater prominence and exercise greater influence" ' in the foreign 
policy process, and have maintained a presence at this level 
(even to the point where "provincial international activity is now 
sufficient to complicate the design and conduct of Canadian 
foreign policy . This transformation elevates the possibility 
that competing notions of foreign policy objectives will arise, as 
well as acute federal-provincial conflicts over international 
affairs.
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The fisheries policy field is an instance of the increased 
frequency of provincial transgovernmental activity. Tc be 
certain, "fisheries in both Canada and the United States have 
become more politicized in recent years."' The result of this 
transformation has been a "democratization""' of the fisheries 
policy-making process, with domestic interests now demanding and 
receiving "a greater collective voice in the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy decisions"in this sector. 
Speaking of sub-national units, Greene and Keating note that it is 
now possible to discern a trend of "greater government involvement 
in all sectors of the fishing industry." As will be shown 
herein, the salmon fisheries case stands as a clear example of 
this underlying tendency for a greater provincial role in the 
fisheries policy field.
CONFIDENCE AND INTEREST: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS & PROVINCI.AL 
TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM
Provincial interest is shaped by the socio-political attitudes 
held by a province's citizens, and these assume important roles in 
shaping collective perceptions of a province's position within 
Canada. These perceptions can function as either implicit 
endorsements of the Canadian federation, or as destabilizing 
interpretations of an invalid or precarious political union. In 
the latter context, over recent decades a "sense of grievance," 
suspicion, and antipathy towards Ottawa has come to characterize 
the political cultures of many provinces, particularly those in
the west." This now seemingly entrenched phenomenon iofren 
referred to as "western alienation" or "regional alienation"' is 
based on the fact that residents of these provinces feel stronger 
attachments to their respective province than they do to Canada as 
a whole. From this perspective, provincial governments need to be 
strong because their citizens have distinct interests that cannot 
be adequately represented by a single national authority that is 
charged with the monumental task of mediating the country's many 
divergent interests. David Elkins expands on this theme of 
federal-provincial relations, stating that provincial alienation 
involves :
An attitude or set of attitudes about the place of 
western provinces (and especially B.C.) in the 
Canadian confederation. It involves beliefs about 
the appropriate distribution of powers and 
jurisdictions between federal and provincial domains 
of politics, feelings about nation, province, and 
locale, expectations about policy responsibility and 
performance, fears about being left out of 
significant political decisions, and the balance 
between national and regional or provincial 
lovalties and identities. '
Regional alienation is an expression of a powerful, yet often 
concealed, sense of discontent among provincialites. At the 
source of this "protectionist" or "protest" approach to 
intergovernmental relations are a variety of factors, namely: (1)
a belief that the region has been exploited, (2) that there has 
been neglect on the part of national institutions which has harmed 
the growth of the region, (3) and, as a result, that national 
institutions have weakened the region.' More specifically, some
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observers note that these regional feelings are derived from a 
legacy of federal policies designed to mitigate discontent among 
central Canadians and, therefore, are inconsiderate of other 
regional concerns." In any case, these sentiments serve to 
reflect and reinforce fears that the federal government is remote 
and uncaring, that provincial governments are inherently more 
attuned to distinct regional interests, and that the federal 
system - if left unchecked - will operate to the detriment of 
distinct provincial interests. As Garth Stevenson notes (and 
bearing in mind the context of this thesis), even policy areas 
under exclusive federal jurisdiction have become sources of 
federal-provincial controversy, primarily because provincial 
governments have grown "dissatisfied with federal policies" and 
"have succeeded in becoming involved in them."""
British Columbians, as citizens of borh a "western province" 
and a distinct regional polity, can claim their own discernable 
sense of alienation and suspicion within the Canadian federation. 
As historian Keith Ralston notes, such sentiment can be traced 
back to the early years of the province's history.
A settled community grew up on the Pacific coast and 
in the valley's and plateaus of the Western 
Cordillera which owed next to nothing to any link 
with the Canadas, and practically everything to its 
oceanic ties to the rest of the world .. It is the 
existence of this self conscious community which 
dictated the nature of the initial struggles within 
the new federation and which called forth and 
hardened attitudes in British Columbia to the 
Central government of the federation, attitudes 
basically unchanged to this day.""
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The B.C. "state of mind" thereby involves perceptions that it is a 
province both emotionally and physically separate from the rest cf 
Canada. Studies reflect this disposition, showing that 70.8- of 
British Columbians report a higher measure of psychological 
closeness to the provincial government than to the federal 
government."' This tendency exposes the heightened reliance 
British Columbians confer upon their provincial government to 
represent and defend their concerns and interests.
Sentiments pertaining to BC alienation is also embodied in the 
views of provincial leaders."' Among provincial politicians there 
exists "feelings of powerlessness regarding federal 
institutions,""' and general understandings that provincial 
interests are not being adequately served by Ottawa."" This 
sentiment is represented by statements such as "It's 2,500 miles 
from Vancouver to Ottawa, but 25,000 from Ottawa to Vancouver.""'
As a result, BC's policy positions are guided more by concerns 
regarding their province's "own affairs and the pursuit of its own 
destin}'" than they are by the goal of establishing the province 
"as a vital and integral part of the Canadian nation." " As such, 
provincial leaders tend to frame BC's stance within Canada in 
terms of identifiable (provincial) interests and, when the pursuit 
of those interests is constrained or negatively affected by 
federal policy, they do not hesitate to reference existing notions 
of western/regional provincial alienation. Garth Stevenson 
explains :
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In resisting or opposing federal initiatives, 
provincial governments make use of a variety of 
arguments. Sometimes they say that the provincial 
government is "closer to the people" and better able 
to understand their needs .. sometimes that their 
province's distinctive "way of life" is in danger .. 
provincial governments argue that federal policies 
discriminate in favor of Ontario and Quebec.'
Indeed, from a provincial perspective, there is usually far too 
much at stake to leave unchallenged federal policies that threaten 
discernable provincial interests.
The inherent culture of criticism and suspicion among 
provincial governments (and in particular western provincial 
governments) with regard to federal policy is not limited to the 
domestic arena. In fact, a compelling relationship exists between 
the politics of provincial discontent and provincial international 
behavior. As Kettner notes, the "political culture of each 
province, whether consensual or conflictuel, will affect its 
external relations."'' It also "makes a great deal of difference 
to the t\pe of international behavior it will pursue."" In this 
context, we will now survey the theoretical literature pertaining 
to (domestic) regional disaffection as a source of provincial 
international activism. This survey relates to the contention 
that the Clark government became internationally active on the PST 
issue as a result of reduced confidence in Ottawa's abilities to 
defend BC's (emergent) interests in the salmon resource.
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Provincial governments seek to protect the interests of their 
citizens. When those interests are threatened by the 
inattentiveness (or perceptions thereof) of federal policy, the 
provinces have been inclined to complain about the alienating 
nature of Ottawa's policies. But what happens when those distinct 
provincial interests are threatened by forces beyond the domestic 
realm? Indeed, there exists "numerous subjects which may tend to 
involve, or create interest in, international developments on the 
part of the Canadian provinces.""' In these instances, does a 
province simply bow out, and place confidence in the federal 
government's ability to represent those interests internationally? 
The answer is "no." As Leeson and Vanderelst suggest, 
international issues involving provincial interests are "not 
singled out for special treatment" merely because they are 
"related to the international system."'' Instead, "provincial 
governments have been disinclined to abandon these concerns at the 
provincial boundary line,""’ viewing such issues as "legitimate 
subjects .. to be advanced and protected by provincial 
governments.""
The province's will, whenever possible, pursue their 
international actions in concert with Ottawa.'' However, the 
underlying sentiments of alienation and regional disregard can 
easily surface, leading tc assumptions that Ottawa cannot or will 
not adequately represent the province's specific concerns at the 
international level. Indeed, provincial politicians sometimes "do
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not think they can rely on the federal government to defend 
provincial interests abroad."'’
As Brian Hocking states, when provincial officials suspect tha: 
they can "no longer rely"*' on Ottawa to represent their 
interests, they can become "sympathetic to the view that their 
interests can only be served through direct influence in the 
policy process."' Indeed, some observers have noted that 
provincial ventures on the international scene can often be 
explained by "provincial suspicions that federal government 
officials do not always pay sufficient or adequate attention to 
provincial interests."'’ Kim Nossal also remarks on the role 
federal disregard assumes in promoting transgovernmentalism:
It is axiomatic that provincial governments exist to 
protect the interests of those citizens resident in 
a province; when those interests are threatened, 
provincial governments are usually quick to try to 
defend them, directly and concretely ... but there 
are too many costs involved in letting the federal 
government alone try to defend a province's 
interests. The provincial government, if nothing 
else, must be seen to be defending provincial 
interests.'
Federal disregard for specific regional interests, and the 
perception thereof on behalf of the provincial leaders, can 
greatly contribute to a province's propensity for 
transgovernmental action. Provincial governments are of the 
disposition that they cannot "always be sure that the federal 
government is willing (or able; to represent their concerns and
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interests abroad satisfactorily."" As Roff Johannson states, 
provincial representatives often believe that their needs are 
"accorded a secondary place in the development of Canadian foreign 
policies.""' Brian Hockino comments:
When regions become primary actors it is often 
because disaffection with national policies combines 
with an inability to alter them through mediation 
with the national authorities. Thus, whereas it's 
not impossible for regions' primary international 
activities to complement those at the centre, it is 
equally likely that they will cut across national 
policies as regional governments respond to the 
pressures imposed on them by external forces .. '"
It is also important to consider the role that bureaucratic 
forces assume in shaping the provincial interest. The development 
of provincial government bureaucracies can influence provinces to 
adopt measures aimed at controlling unfavorable variables - 
including those at the international level - that adversely impact 
upon their vested (bureaucratici interest."' As Stephen Brooks 
writes, it is "rational for politicians and bureaucrats .. to 
behave in ways that are likely to increase their control over 
factors relevant to the future of the organizations to which they 
belong.""’ Provincial governments are inclined to stake ground on 
any issues that may adversely affect the bureaucracy within which 
they have invested so heavily. When doing so, it makes little 
difference whether those issues lay within the international or 
domestic arena. These tendencies are heightened by provincial 
perceptions of a job poorly done by federal authorities charged 
with some level of influence/responsibility over these
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bureaucratie interests. As Munton and Levy observe, a "decline in 
federal effectiveness, or at least the perception by the provinces 
of such a decline, coupled with .. enlarged provincial 
bureaucracies, has thus led to a greater degree of provincial 
involvement, not only in domestic but also so-called 'foreign 
policy' issues." ■■■
Occasionally, provincial bureaucracies can develop to the point 
where they match or exceed the expertise and capacity of those at 
the federal level. History demonstrates that when this occurs, 
provinces can be instilled with "greater confidence in their 
ability to promote their own interests, first within Canada but 
increasingly abroad. " Thus, bureaucratic forces can instill in 
a province a heightened and implicit sense of confidence that it, 
not the federal government, is the political authority best suited 
tc defend provincial interests." It is precisely in this manner 
that such forces influenced the Clark government's 
transgovernmental fisheries policy.
What sorts of actions will a province take when its interests 
are threatened by forces within federal jurisdiction, such as 
international affairs? As Brian Hocking remarks, provincial 
"governments will use their own resources to shape those aspects 
of the international environment which impinge most directly on 
them: they do so by adopting policies in areas either partly or 
exclusively under their control and by direct activity in the
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inrernacional sysrem.""' Hocking's also asserrs that provinces 
will defend their interests by "exploiting whatever opportunities 
for international activity are afforded them by the constitutional 
allocation of powers and the linkages between foreign and domestic 
policy.""' Often, the dynamics of federal-provincial conflicts 
and their relationship to transgovernmental behavior dictate that 
disputes in one policy area (in this case, fisheries) can spill 
over into others, including those touching on defense and military 
security (in this case, the Nanoose torpedo testing facility)."
In the context of this thesis, Clark's threat to cancel the 
American lease of the Nanoose facility represents each of these 
tendencies with regard to provincial transgovernmental behaviour.
We should also consider the nature of federal responses tc 
independent provincial transgovernmental activity. Federal 
responses vary depending on "the degree to which its primacy in 
the foreign policy field is jeopardized."'" Reactions can range 
from "accommodation" tc "intransigence." For example, if the 
extra-national actions of a province are deemed to be in conflict 
with federal policy, Ottawa will typically "oppose the provincial 
governments and try to close down their efforts.""' In this 
thesis we will see that because the premier's stance threatened 
federal interests relating to national security, the federal 
government made repeated efforts to dissuade him from using the 
Nanoose torpedo facility to advance his fisheries policy. When 
Clark refused to withdraw his threats surrounding Nanoose, Ottawa
proceeded to interpret BC's position as compromising its authority 
over national security, and took steps to expropriate the 
provincially owned lands at Nanoose. This move by the federal 
government can clearly be interpreted as an effort to "close down" 
the province's attempt to link the fishery with other (federally- 
controlled) issues.
This chapter has surveyed the theoretical literature regarding 
provincial transgovernmentalism. In this context it has shown 
that while most provincial international activity conforms to the 
tradition of federal leadership in this sector, there nevertheless 
exists increasingly frequent instances of independent provincial 
international behavior rhac contradict this norm. There is little 
in the way of theory that explains this form of provincial 
international behavior. The literature chat does exiscs, though, 
indicates that a province's transgovernmental activity is 
typically motivated by a lack of confidence in Ottawa's 
representation of discernable provincial interests. It has also 
shown that the provinces will employ whatever resources are at 
their disposal when attempting to leverage their position on an 
international issue, and that Ottawa will typically move to close 
down these efforts, depending upon the extent to which its primacy 
over foreian oolicv is threatened.
CHAPTER 3 - FACTOR ONE: PROVINCIAL INTEREST IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION & THE SALMON 
RESOURCE
This Chapter introduces the first factor influencing BC's 
transgovernmental policy on the PST issue: provincial interest.
This factor gained prominence with the establishment of a 
provincial environmental protection regime during the early to mid 
1990s. This regime resulted in an increased provincial interest in 
the salmon resource, and helps explain BC's aggressive PST policy.
JURSIDICTIONAL AUTHORITY OVER OCEAN FISHERIES
Natural resource development is universally recognized as a 
critical component of Canada's historical development. Indeed, 
from its beginning as a colonial outpost of the French and British 
imperial empires, through to its contemporary " continentalist" 
market alignment with the United States, Canada's fate has been 
inextricably linked tc the extraction and commoditization of its 
base of raw resource staples.” These resources have been an 
integral component in determining the pace, pattern, and (regional; 
character of social and economic development within the nation, 
and, as one observer notes, "instrumental in determining some of 
the most important issues of Canadian life."”
Under the terms of Canada's Constitution, most of the nation's 
natural resources fall under the jurisdictional authority of the 
provinces. Especially pertinent are sections 92 & 109 of the
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Brirish North America (BNA) Act, 18 67.'-" However, there exists a 
specific resource sector that defies this logic - Canada's ocean 
fisheries, resources that, by virtue of Section 91.12 of the BNA 
Act, 18 57, fall squarely under the auspices of the federal 
government."" Thus, since the time of Confederation, it has been 
the federal government that has shaped the content, quality, and 
context of policy in this sector. In the words of Patricia 
Marchak, Ottawa - via the Department of Fisheries and Oceans''
(DFO) - has essentially determined "who has the right to fish, the 
right tc manage the fish, and the right to exclude others" from 
fishing in Canada's coastal waters.'" This thesis focuses on the 
most valuable'" and culturally'" integral fishery on Canada's west 
coast. Pacific Salmon. Although this resource is controlled and 
managed by the federal government, the nature of salmon habitat 
requirements dictates that it is affected by activities that occur 
in other resource sectors, most of which are under provincial 
jurisdiction (such as forestry, mining, hydro-electric development, 
etc.I.
HABITAT REQUIREMENTS OF PACIFIC SALMON
Critical linkages exist between salmon and their natural
surroundings, and "the relationship between the salmon and their
environment can be as subtle as any in nature." As Stuart
Culbertson (former .Assistant Deputy Minister for Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food) states, "habitat, habitat, habitat is to salmon
what location, location, location is to real estate spe c u l a t o r s '
35
Salmon are dependent on and are adapted to the ecology of an 
entire watershed."'" Water connects all components of this 
environment, is necessary for maintaining the sysrem's overall 
biological integrity," and is the life-blood of the entire 
ecosystem. In healthy watersheds numerous riparian zones are 
arranged in a web-like network of repetitive patterns of plant and 
animal habitat. Forested areas connect these riparian areas up and 
down the terrain, and allow a diversity of plants, animals, and 
insects to exist between habitat patches. Water enters the 
watershed as snow or rain, then seeps down and percolates through 
the forest soil until it encounters an exposed water table such as
a creek, river, or stream. Small watercourses connect with larger
ones until they reach the ocean. With their quality influenced by
everything they touch, rivers and streams reflect the physical,
biological and chemical characteristics of rhe surrounding 
environment. - ' '
For millions of years the biogenetics and life-requirements of 
salmon have been shaped by the diversity of ecological conditions 
that arise in the watershed environment."’ In healthy water 
systems, juvenile and spawning salmon alike rest and seek refuge 
from predators by hiding under logjams and behind boulder clusters 
formed by the flowing water. Logs fallen within the river force a 
diversion of water to create deep, shadowed pools where salmon can 
shelter themselves from predators and excessive summer 
temperatures. Where trees and rocks have trapped gravel on the
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upstream side salmon find prime spawning locations. ' The
intertwined vegetation that covers the shoreline adds nutrients’’ 
to the water, attracts terrestrial insect prey for the fish,’’’ and 
prevents erosion"’’ by stabilizing the stream bank. Vegetation also 
serves to regulate the over-production of in-stream algae’’' by 
controlling the amount and quality of photo-synthetically active 
radiation that reaches the w a t e r . W i t h  each of these and other’ ' 
factors contributing to the composition and quality of the inland 
aquatic environment, it is clear that the health and stability of 
watersheds is a core requirement for the perpetuation of a healthy 
fishery resource."’'
The dependency of salmon on their surrounding habitat is so 
extensive and fundamental that salmon are often referred to as 
"indicator species." Essentially, indicator species are those 
living things that are found to occur when their habitats are 
pristine or near pristine in quality, but do not occur when that 
environment is degraded or compromised in quality. In this sense, 
their presence alone is sufficient to indicate that specific 
environmental conditions are also present. In the case cf salmon, 
their abundance in the rivers and streams of a watershed may be 
taken as an indication that the comprehensive biological integrity 
of that complex ecosystem is both intact and functional.
Conversely, if studies reveal that salmon numbers have been reduced 
indications might point to an underlying environmental distortion 
or anomaly.
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SALMON HABITAT AT THE INTERFACE OF OTHER ECONOMIC SECTORS
The watersheds on which salmon depend are valued for their 
utility beyond that pertaining to fish. As Patricia Marchak 
explains "we need to consider the total resource rather than only 
the wild fish ... Fish live in seas, rivers, streams, and lakes for 
which there are other commercial and non-commercial uses."’’' Human 
uses of the watershed are numerous and many activities have an 
adverse affect on the quality of the watershed environment within 
which they occur. At this point it is important to remain 
cognizant of the fact that each of these development sectors lay 
within the jurisdictional purview of the province(s).
Few industries are as detrimental to salmon habitat as forestry.
Indeed, the processes associated with accessing and removing timber
from forested land can seriously disturb the natural ecology of
watersheds. In BC, the sheer size, intensity, and scale of
forestry - long the foundation of the provincial economy -
exacerbate these detrimental effects. The removal of large stands
of trees and the age-old practice of clear-cut logging destabilizes
the land base (especially in areas of steep terrain), minimizes
water retention, and increases peak water flows throughout the
forest. It also removes the riparian vegetation that attracts
insects, provides shelter, and creates shaded pools. The excessive
run-offs (particularly in the advent of heavy precipitation
levels’’) that are an inevitable result of industrial logging
contribute to the obstruction of fish migration as stream and river
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gullies become loaded with discarded logs, stumps, and ocher 
debris. Also, as water rushes tnrough the altered foresc 
landscape ic creates landslides down to the scream banks, chus 
increasing Che quanCiCy of sediment carried into the wacercourse. 
These elevated sediment levels negatively affect the salmon by 
clogging spawning gravel, smothering aquacic insects on the 
streambed, filling in pools, and blocking side channels otherwise 
occupied by juvenile salmon.^' Furthermore, in areas where logging 
roads have been poorly situated, chronic surface erosion"’ and the 
air-borne transport of fine sediments*’’ combine to impair water 
qualicy. In sum "the concentration of logging practiced in B.C. 
causes severe degradation of local forests - soil, water, plants, 
animals, and human uses ... [It] treats a diverse, heterogeneous 
ecosystem wich a harsh, homogenous approach."*"
Logging is ncc the only human activicy co have a negative impacc 
on salmon and cheir habitat. The mining industry introduces 
tailings saturated with acidic compounds, heavy metals, and other 
coxic wastes into the soil and groundwacer syscems* tin che United 
Scates ic has been escimaced chac some 12,000 miles of rivers and 
180,000 acres of fish habicac have been severely polluced by Che 
mining induscry* i. The agricultural sector clears forested land 
for farming, diverts or blocks rivers for irrigacion purposes, and 
introduces inorganic pesticides into the water table.' Similarly, 
urban development blocks, diverts, alters or simply eradicates 
critical salmon streams and habitat areas. Industrial activity
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(i.e.: pulp mills, refining, etc.) discharges harmful pollutants 
into waterways. ■' The construction of hydroelectric dams can 
completely impede certain salmon stocks from reaching their 
spawning grounds, and (through reduced flows) may dramatically 
alter temperature fluctuation ranges to the point where waters 
become entirely unreceptive to the fundamental health requirements 
of salmon. Clearly there is a wide range of human activity that 
can negatively impact on salmon habitat.
HISTORY OF BC GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO PROTECT SALMON HABITAT
The fact that the province has jurisdiction over those resource 
and development sectors that affect salmon habitat in a negative 
manner has not, until recently, translated into fish-sensitive 
policies. In fact, the habitat needs of salmon have traditionally 
been low on the priority list of BC governments. A legacy of 
provincial inattentiveness to such issues reflects this 
disposition. Geoff Meggs comments:
The dumping of toxic mine tailings by Utah Mines in 
Quatsino Sound poisoned kilometers of the inlet.
Pulp mills rose on the Fraser. A full twenty years 
later, public protest would force fisheries studies 
which proved that the mills routinely dumped 
effluent exceeding both in volume and degree of 
contamination the amounts set out in their permits. 
Estuary land in the Fraser delta was dyked and 
filled ... [resulting in] the steady erosion of fish 
stocks and fish habitat which threatened the 
ultimate collapse of the salmon runs.'"'
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Over the course of BC history provincial governmenrs have 
displayed a strong pro-development bias. '' ' For example, in 195 4 
Premier W.A.C Bennett made a unilateral agreement with the Kaiser 
Corporation to build a giant dam on the Columbia River to provide 
downstream power for the US. This initial agreement was 
invalidated by Ottawa, though, which sought to control the terms 
of development for the Columbia on the "grounds that 
international relations were at stake" and promptly enacted 
legislation requiring a federal license to make alterations to 
any transboundary rivers.Eventually, negotiations between the 
two countries led to the signing of the Columbia River Treaty in 
1961 - an agreement that called for the development of BC's 
portion of the Columbia River basin.''' The disruption this 
project imposed on fish stocks caused widespread controversy. 
Opponents argued "tremendous fish losses" already occurred in the 
US where no less than ten hydroelectric plants had been built on 
the Columbia.'" These concerns went largely unheeded, though, 
and over the next decade three dams were constructed in BC.
Another example of the province's willingness to forego 
fishery concerns occurred in 1952 when W.A.C. Bennett gave 
serious consideration to allowing the construction on the Fraser 
River of what would then have been the world's largest dam.'' A 
27 0 meter-high dam was to be constructed twenty kilometers north 
of Lillooet, and the reservoir would have extended over 260 
kilometers from Lillooet to Quesnel. Although estimated
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hvdroeiectric benefits were unmatched (the electrical capacity 
would have been equivalent to the Grand Coulee and two Hoover
dams combined), the impact on the river's salmon stocks would
have been nothing short of disastrous. As Federal Fisheries
Minister Jack Davis argued at the time, the dam (a "monstrosit;.-" :
would have "permanently altered the ecology of the Fraser River 
Delta."’' -Although (unlike the Columbia River) this project was 
eventually shelved due to public protest, the fact that it was 
even considered is testimony to the pro-development bias of the 
province and its willingness to ignore the environmental needs of 
fish in the pursuit of such ends.
The federal government has taken steps to constrain those 
provincially endorsed development activities that have an adverse 
impact on salmon and their habitat.’" In this context, 
protection measures contained within the Canada Fisheries .Act are 
the primary legal tool by which Ottawa seeks to place limitations 
on such activities.’ Since, however, the contractual property 
rights of resource industries "constitute powerful claims against 
the fish resource" there is a potential for federal-provincial 
conflict when Ottawa enforces its fisheries law.’’ Norman Ruff 
explains :
Collisions between provincial policies on logging, 
mining or industrial development and federal 
policing of BC's migratory salmon habitats and the 
Canada Fisheries Act present the greatest potential 
for conflict.’’
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Discord between the federal and provincial levels has occurred 
on several occasions. In the 1970s, for instance, Ottawa 
attempted to resist logging efforts that threatened salmon habitat 
in the Riley Creek-Rennell Sound area of the Queen Charlotte 
Islands.' ' Also, on various occasions it has taken legal action 
to order the release of water from Alcan's Kemano dam, so as to 
increase flow levels in the Fraser River and to keep water 
temperatures at appropriate levels for fish.'’ These federal 
actions are evidence not only of its willingness to intervene 
where provincially endorsed industrial activities threaten salmon 
habitat,'’ but also of its reluctance to leave salmon habitat 
protection to the vagaries of EC's pro-development governments.
There are numerous instances where the province has attempted 
to counter federal efforts to place limitations on provincially 
endorsed development activities and policy measures. In 1977, for 
example, the EC government unsuccessfully challenged Ottawa's 
efforts to strengthen' the Canada Fisheries Act. It argued that 
such a move would "be out of step with multiple resource use 
essential to a healthy economy."' Later, in a test case 
regarding the subsequently strengthened federal Fisheries Act, the 
province reiterated these claims.' Again, conflicts such as 
these are indicative of the gulf that traditionally separated the 
priorities of the province from those of the federal government as 
they pertain to the interface of the fishery with other 
development sectors. Moreover, these conflicts expose the manner
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by which the province incerpreted Ottawa's representation of 
fishery values as being a threat to its own obligations to those 
sectors for which it has explicit constitutional responsibility, 
most notably forestry and mining.
Despite the province's tradition of opposing federal efforts to 
place limitations on development sectors within its purview of 
powers, in the late 1980s Victoria did in fact take steps - albeit 
meager steps - to protect fish habitat from degradation. This 
occurred in 1988 when Bill Vander Zalm's Social Credit government 
introduced the Coastal Fisheries-Forestry Guidelines (CFFG).
These guidelines, however, were administered on a purely voluntary 
basis and, in that sense, amounted to nothing more than 
recommendations for forestry companies on how to mitigate the 
environmentally negative impact of their logging efforts. Indeed, 
the move was more symbolic than substantive, and in no significant 
way were the logging companies compelled to alter their 
environmentally destructive practices. Thus, despite the creation 
of the guidelines (and the symbolism inherent in such a policy 
measure) the development of the forest industry at the expense of 
critical salmon habitat continued unabated towards the end of the 
198 0s. Indeed, the fact that such measures achieved "very 
little"' ' is not surprising given the traditional "pro­
business," ' "hyper-capitalist" ethic in Victoria. Only a 
dramatic shift in government ideology and priorities, it appeared.
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could reshape provincial policy ro consider salmon habirar. This 
rransformarion soon came.
ESTABLISHING A PROVINCIAL EN^/IRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGIME
Towards the end of the 1980s a significant value shift took 
place within both British Columbian and Canadian society. The 
public became increasingly aware of the negative environmental 
consequences of uncontrolled industrial growth and development.' 
Comparatively, whereas in 1987 only 37.51 of British Columbians 
reported themselves to be "very concerned" about the quality of 
the environment, by 1989 that figure had climbed to 56.1r.‘"’ The 
incumbent Social Credit government, however, failed to gauge the 
power of the emergent environmental movement. As Daniel Gawthrop 
comments "many of them still held on to a nostalgic vision of the 
past" - the "boom period" when "the great Soared patriarch, W.A.C. 
Bennett, was able to do indulge in a spree of development and 
forest harvesting without worrying about the consequences." As 
Kathryn Harrison reflects, this naivete on behalf of the incumbent 
government was carried through into the provincial election of 
1991 :
No mention of the environment was made in Social 
Credit campaign literature, and the environment 
minister at the time decried the NDP's 'pie in the 
Sky' environmental platform as 'ignoring economic 
reality.' The premier, Rita Johnston, promised to 
favor jobs over 'environmental terrorists.' '
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Unlike the Social Credit Party, Mike Harcourt's Mew Democratic 
Party (NOP) accurately gauged the public's sympathy for 
environmentalism. Indeed, the NDP staked out green policy 
positions long before the 1991 election, and this theme was 
pursued in the October campaign." As part of its election 
strategy the NDP published and widely distributed a document 
outlining the twenty-four bills pertaining to the environment that 
its Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) introduced while in 
opposition.'" They also released a detailed 48-point election 
platform, a full one-third of which specifically addressed 
provincial environmental matters.'" Among these initiatives were 
pledges to establish a comprehensive and inclusive land-use 
process, a clean air and water management strategy, a series of 
waste management and recycling programs, wildlife protection 
initiatives, a "Protected Areas Strategy" (promising to double the 
extent of protected areas in the province ro 12 ), and 
environmental assessment processes. Bolstered by a slate of 
health care reform proposals, the environmental portion of the 
NDP's election platform resonated positively with the electorate. 
In conjunction with the distinct lack of popular support for the 
scandal-plagued Social Credit incumbents, this combination of 
policy platforms contributed significantly to the NDP's success at 
the ballot box. Eventually, as we will soon see, it would also 
contribute to an increased "provincial interest" in the federally 
controlled salmon fishery.
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RESTRAINING THE FOREST INDUSTRY
After achieving its mandate in October of 1991, and with 
environmental issues continuing to dominate public concern, '' Mike 
Harcourt's New Democrats moved swiftly to implement an ambitious 
slate of environmental policies. One of the first initiatives was 
a review of BC logging practices - a process that involved a very 
general and limited survey of compliance to the environmental 
protection regulations spelled out in the Coastal Fisheries- 
Forestry Guidelines (CFFG).'"' The report subsequently exposed 
that the regulations appeared to be ineffective and that "the 
standards of fish habitat protection implied by the CFFG were 
frequently not achieved."
With concerns about BC logging practices now sufficiently 
elevated, in 1992 the government hired Tripp Biological 
Consultants to conduct an in-depth study of the effectiveness of 
the CFFG on Vancouver Island. This study confirmed the existence 
of serious compliance problems. Of the 53 stream ecosystems 
examined, 34 had experienced serious habitat damage because of 
environmentally insensitive logging practices.'" In fact, six 
prime salmon bearing streams had suffered complete habitat loss."' 
The report stated that although the guidelines had the potential 
to "reduce the number and severity of the impacts experienced on 
streams in recently logged areas," compliance was "generally 
poor."' The Tripp report thereby exposed the ineffectiveness of 
the Coastal Fisheries-Forestrv Guidelines.
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Provincial Forest Minister, Dan Miller, reacting angrily" to 
the report's findings, commissioned Tripp to conduct yet another 
audit of CFFG compliance levels. This subsequent inquiry was more 
thorough, though, and covered the entire BC coast, not just
Vancouver Island. It focused on seventy-nine cut-blocks in five
forest regions harvested since the CFFG were introduced in 1988.
The findings bore strong similarities to those from the previous 
Vancouver Island studies. It revealed that the conditions on the 
Island were "fairly representative of conditions in the other 
districts audited."'" One-half to two-thirds of streams with
fisheries concerns had experienced a major or moderate impact of
some type.'" The damage occurred primarily because of poor road 
siting, construction, and maintenance, contributing to surface 
erosion, poor drainage controls, and encroachment on streams.
Also cited were inadequate debris cleanup, poor falling and 
yarding practices, stream misclassifications, and inappropriate 
activities beside, in, or over streams, the result of which was 
stream torrents, slides, or blow-downs, most of which occurred 
after the actual logging process.'"
The existing regulatory regime was, from the perspective of the 
Environment, Lands, and Parks Minister, Moe Sihota, and the Forest 
Minister, Andrew Petter (whom had replaced Miller in this 
portfolio I ,  "out of date, inadequately enforced, and incapable of 
deterring poor practices."' Both declared that, given the 
severity of environmental neglect by the forest companies and the
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obvious fact that they could not be relied on to police 
themselves, it was now incumbent on the province to impose a code 
of environmental conduct to protect BC's environment. '
Subsequently, in May 1994, the "Forest Practices Code" was 
introduced to the provincial legislature. It was later proclaimed 
law in April 1995, and the regulations took effect in June of that 
year.
The NDP's Forest Practices Code consisted of numerous 
regulations and guidelines, all of which expanded and codified 
EC's forest-based environmental protection regime."' The Code 
includes specific provisions aimed at insulating salmon habitat 
from degradation due to industrial logging operations. Under the 
terms of the Code, before logging permits are issued audits are 
conducted on streams, rivers, and aquatic bodies that occur within 
the proposed cut-blocks to determine if there are significant 
risks to sensitive and "high value"' ' fish-bearing streams. 
Depending on the extent to which logging threatens the stream 
environment, non-harvest tones of up to 50 meters and buffer tones 
of up to 30 meters (where logging is strictly regulated) can be 
imposed on logging operations that occur in the vicinity of such 
waterways. For the forest companies, however, increased 
regulations equate to increased production costs. Governrrient 
estimates projected that the Forest Practices Code would cost the 
industry roughly $500 million per annuiri, but the forest companies 
arrived at a much larger figure: between $1.1 and $1.9 billion
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dollars." ' Clearly, the costs associated with protecting fish 
habitat imposed significant economic constraints on BC forest 
operations.‘ "
Because the Code imposed limitations on the operation of BC's 
most important resource industry, a serious dilemma arose for the 
Harcourt government: how could the frustrations of workers 
displaced by the government's environmental policies be addressed? 
The government's answer to this question was the "Forest Renewal 
Plan," announced in April 1994. The plan established a new crown 
corporation - "Forest Renewal BC" - to oversee the allocation of 
funds derived from increases to stumpage fees. These funds - 
approximately $2 billion over 5 years" ' - were subsequently used 
to hire forestry workers adversely affected by the government's 
green regime (to fulfill the premier's very public promise that 
"not one forest worker will be left without the option to work in
the forest as a result of a land use decision"' ). As with the
Forest Practices Code, the Forest Renewal Plan also contained 
initiatives that focused on improving the biological integrity of
salmon habitat. These were contained under the Watershed
Restoration Program. This program aimed to "accelerate the 
restoration of logging-impacted watersheds" by rectifying the 
"loss of summer and over-winter habitat for rearing salmonids" 
that would otherwise "require a century or more to recover."" 
Efforts under the Watershed Restoration Program involved the
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rehabilitation of degraded stream channels and rhe stabilizarion 
f peripheral hill slopes, roads, and stream banks.o
The proactive environmental approach of Mike Harcourt's 
government was not limited to forests. Indeed, the decidedly 
green policy regime established by his administration extended far 
into other sectors. Thus, to understand the increased
"provincial interest" in the salmon resource, we must also briefly 
examine fish protection policies relating to these sectors. These 
are discussed below.
PULP MILL EFFLUENTS
By-products of the paper-milling process are discharged as 
toxic effluent and constitute the largest source of industrial 
pollution in Canada.' " These effluents kill salmon and other 
fish," and also destroy kelp, poison aquatic invertebrates, and 
emit bio-accumulative, cancer-causing/hormone-disrupting chemicals 
into the ecosystem."* On numerous occasions the accumulation of 
such pollutants'" has resulted in fisheries closures along the BC 
coast.
One of the Harcourt government's first environmental policies 
dealt with water quality protection and the regulation of pulp 
mill effluents. In January 1992, the NDP government legislated 
that all pulp mills operating in the province adhere to an A0%' * * 
standard of 1.5 kg/Adt"' by the beginning of 1996, and, by
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December 31 2002, completely eliminate these pollutants.^ As a 
result of this law AOX discharges across all BC mills dropped by 
50* between 1991 and 1993, and the average total daily dioxin 
discharges - when compared to 1990 levels - dropped by 35 
Again, fisheries habitat was a clear beneficiary of these 
policies.
THE PROTECTED AREAS STRATEGY
Another major provincial environmental directive of the 
Harcourt government was the Protected Areas Strategy. Again, this 
policy bore a direct relevance to the salmon resource. The 
Protected Areas Strategy emerged in association with the Harcourt 
government's Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE), a 
department established in 1992 and headed by former ombudsman 
Stephen Owen. CORE'S mandate was to revise BC's relatively ad-hoc 
and woefully ineffective land use management system and replace it 
with a much more collaborative, comprehensive, and inclusive 
system based on the recognition of a plurality of interests and 
concerns. Moreover, CORE was to assist in fulfilling the 
government's commitment to meet the United Nations' recommendation 
that, in the name of sustainability, polities throughout the world 
protect 12- of their representative ecosystems."'
Via the CORE process, wilderness areas throughout BC were 
designated as "study areas" to be considered for protected area 
status by virtue of their combined ecosystemic, cultural, and
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recreational value."' In such areas land and resources would not 
be subject to sale, and mining, logging, and hydroelectric 
activities were forbidden. From a green perspective, this 
environmental protection program proved to be rather successful: 
between 1993 and 1996 CORE and the Protected Areas Strategy 
established more than 200 new parks and protected areas throughout 
the province" (eventually, these designations did succeed in 
bringing the province to its 12'^  objective"*) . It is critical to 
acknowledge that throughout the decision-making prooess concerns 
relating to salmon habitat were of "paramount importance""" in 
determining which areas would become off-limits to development.
The significance of salmon habitat issues in government 
designations of protected areas is well illustrated in the 
creation of the Tatshenshini-Alsek Wilderness Park. In the 
decades following the Second World War, BC (along with some other 
Canadian provinces) experienced a phenomenal rate of economic 
development and expansion. BC's endowment of natural resources 
fueled this post-war boom. Early in this period (1958), one of 
the many companies seeking to exploit BC's resource base conducted 
mineral evaluation studies in a remote, uninhabited area in the 
northwest corner of the province (situated between the southern 
rip of Alaska and the Yukon). The company was searching for 
deposits of copper and other minerals. It succeeded. One of the 
world's largesr copper deposits was discovered beneath Windy 
Craggy Mountain near Tats Creek (which eventually flows into the
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Tatshenshini and Alsek Rivers). Moreover, the copper was 
surrounded by other valuable metal deposits. The cumulative value 
of these minerals was estimated to be $S.5 billion.
It was not until the late 198 0s that Geddes Resources (the 
company holding the access rights to the Windy Craggy mineral 
deposits) submitted a proposal to the provincial government to 
construct massive underground and open pit mines to begin 
extractions of the minerals. This proposal spawned almost instant 
criticism from environmental groups'"'’ which proceeded to lobby 
against the project in an ''unprecedented" manner."' The strength 
of their convictions stemmed from the fact that the ore deposits 
under Windy Craggy are interlaced with high concentrations of 
sulphur, which, when released in the extraction process, would mix 
with air and water to form sulphuric acid. They claimed that the 
waste rock and tailings generated during the extraction process 
would create enough acidic leachate to eradicate all aquatic life 
in the Tatshenshini and Alsek Rivers.
Faced with a looming controversy surrounding Windy Craggy, the 
NDP government decided in July 1992 that the Geddes proposal 
should 'oe submitted to the CORE process for review. The 
preliminary CORE report revealed that the project did in fact pose 
a clear threat to the health of aquatic life throughout the 
region. "Fish and pristine aquatic habitat" were not only deemed 
to be a "vital part" of the local ecosystem, but also the Alsek
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River sysrem was identified as one of the three major salmon 
bearing rivers along the northern Pacific coast.—' Moreover, the 
report concluded that the Tatshenshini River contributes 95 of 
the Chinook salmon, 90* of the sockeye salmon, and 75- of the coho 
salmon to the commercial fishery at the river's mouth.— Because 
of the abundance of salmon, the Tatshenshini-Alsek region is also 
home to a flourishing grizzly bear population— " and the largest 
gathering of bald eagles in the world.” " The final CORE report, 
issued in January 1993, concluded that the interests of mining and 
those of the regional environment were entirely "incompatible.""' 
Premier Mike Harcourt announced the rejection of the Windy Craggy 
plan, and proposed the establishment of the Tatshenshini-Alsek 
Wilderness Park.—’" Thus neither now nor in the future would the 
fish and wilderness values inherent to the region face compromise 
at the hands of resource developers.
The economic costs of protecting the fishery habitat of the 
Tatshenshini-Alsek Wilderness area were not modest. Realizing 
that Royal Oak Mines"” (which purchased Geddes Resources shortly 
after the CORE report; would demand compensation for the lost 
development opportunity, the province began remunerative 
negotiations with the company. Eventually, in 1995, the 
government paid S104 million in compensation for the cancelled 
project, and also agreed to assist in funding two of Royal Oak's 
new mine developments." " Clearly a significant price was to be 
borne for assuring the protection of the province's fish and
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wildlife. These costs, however, did not deter the province from 
continuing in its effort to fulfill the mandate of the Protected 
Areas Strategy (and thereby improve protection for fish habitat).
In 1994, for example, Environment Minister Moe Sihota announced 
Class A park status was to be established near Chilko Lake. This 
park (called ”Ts'yl-os Park"), like the Tatshenshini, "was rich in 
vulnerable wildlife .. [and] home to the third largest salmon run 
in the province
THE KEMANO COMPLETION PROJECT
The Harcourt administration's willingness to stop previously 
arranged development initiatives that threatened salmon (and their 
habitat) did not end with the cancellation of the Windy Craggy 
project. Another example is the termination of the Kemano 
Completion Project (KCP). In 1950 an agreement between the Alcan 
Corporation and the Province provided the company with water 
diversion (rental) rights to both the Nechako and Nanika Rivers. 
These diversion rights were granted to Alcan so that it could 
develop a massive hydroelectric facility to power an aluminum 
smelter in the town of Kitimat. These water rental rights were to 
be exercised prior to the end of the century, upon which time the 
company would receive a license in perpetuity for the water 
required to operate hydroelectric facilities constructed before 
the millennial deadline. The first phase of this project was 
completed in 1954, and resulted in reversing approximately three- 
quarters of the original flow of the Nechako River.""
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The KCP was an extension of Alcan's original project. The 
deadline for the company to exercise its water access rights 
prompted Alcan to make plans for a second water diversion and 
hydroelectric development facility, despite the fact that the 
additional electrical power generation capacity was not yet 
required.-"' Concerns over the KCP's further impact on resident 
salmon stocks, however, were evident long before the second 
proposal was tabled. By refusing to release what DFO officials 
deemed to be sufficient levels of water for salmon, the company 
had demonstrated that it would not hesitate to marginalize the 
interests of fish in order fulfill its corporate agenda."'
Ottawa's concerns, along with those of Alcan and the (pro­
development) provincial government, were later addressed in 1987 
when (in an effort to avoid court action) the three parties came 
to an agreement regarding water flows.""" Shortly thereafter, in 
1988, Alcan began construction of the project's $1.3 billion final 
stage.
Although Alcan and the two levels of government were themselves 
satisfied with the 1987 agreement, the citizens and lobby groups 
concerned about the environmental impact of the KCP were not 
appeased."'' Aboriginal, environmental, and citizens' groups 
persisted with their arguments that the KCP posed a clear and 
obvious threat to salmon. The Rivers Defense Coalition, for 
example, stated that "even with the proposed remedial measures in 
place, [KCP] poses unacceptable risks to the fish resources and
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the environment."'’ Later, more controversy emerged as it was 
revealed that undue pressure had been placed on federal fisheries 
scientists to tone down their criticisms of the KCP, and their 
specific concerns that the project would result in a 90- reduction 
in the salmon runs of the Nechako, Nanika-Bulkley, and Kemanc 
River systems.'’' The opposition groups eventually rallied to 
challenge the project in the federal courts, arguing that KCP 
required a federal energy Assessment Review Process Certificate 
before further construction could occur. In May 1991 the federal 
court ruled in favor of the environmental groups and Alcan ceased 
work on the project immediately.
The Harcourt government conducted a full inquiry into the 
project's potential for negative environmental impact. In January 
1993, the premier announced that the BC Utilities Commission 
(BCUC) would hold public hearings on the issue.'’" In its final 
report of December 1994, the BCUC reported that the KCP would have 
an acutely negative impact on the salmon resource.’’' It 
recommended three specific remedial actions that could be adopted 
to minimize the project's adverse impact on fisheries."’’ In 
January 1995, though, Harcourt stated he would side with the 64-'’ 
of British Columbians who felt the project should be cancelled"’’ 
because it "threatened the Nechako and Fraser River fish 
stocks."'’ The premier himself later reflected on the reasons for 
the decision:
5 8
the evidence was pretty conclusive .. it was going tc 
bring water down to a trickle and have adverse 
effects right throughout the Nechako River system, 
and great potential for serious harm to the Fraser 
River fisherv.’’'
There remained an obvious problem, though: how to remunerate 
Alcan. In July 1995, a framework for remuneration was tentatively 
reached between the province and Alcan."’" Eventually, in March 
19 96, the province and Alcan finalized an agreement tc settle the 
outstanding legal issues related to the project's cancellation. ’ 
This expensive compensatory package involved major commitments by 
the province to provide electricity to future Alcan projects and to 
make future purchases of assigned quantities of surplus power from 
the existing Kemano facility.Again, the lengths the provincial 
government was willing to go to protect salmon reflects its 
increasing interest in the resource.
THE BC HERITAGE RIVERS SYSTEM
While the NDP government was busy attempting to bring closure to
the KCP issue, it was also proactively pursuing the implementation
of other environmental policies. Again, the notion of protecting
salmon habitat from development and industrial activity assumed a
pivotal role in such initiatives, and thereby further contributed
to the increasing provincial interest in the salmon resource. In
May 1995, for example, the province announced the creation of the
BC Heritage Rivers System and established the BC Heritage Rivers
Board - a public advisory body charged with the task of identifying
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provincially-significanc rivers and providing legal protection for 
them according to their "ecological, historical, recreational or 
cultural value."■■■ As the Board's first annual report implies, 
salmon and fishery values were integral in determining which rivers 
would be considered for Heritage status:
The health of the land and all its inhabitants are 
compromised without healthy rivers. Rivers are the 
veins and arteries of the earth carrying life-giving 
waters from their origins in glaciers, snowfields, 
lakes and wetlands down to the sea. They provide 
habitat for aquatic and land species .. First 
Nations' cultures have been shaped by their 
associations with these great waterways, from 
dependence on the salmon to their use as inter­
tribal trading routes.
The Board's report subsequently nominated several BC rivers for 
heritage status, and in each case specific reference was made 
regarding their value to the salmon resource. The Adams River, 
for example, was deemed to have an "extremely high significance to 
salmon protection in the province," and represented "the most 
significant sockeye enhancement opportunity in the Fraser 
B a s i n . I n  the same context the Babine River was stated to have 
"an extremely productive fishery of anadromous fish species,""'' 
the Cowichan River was acknowledged as one of the "world's best"'" 
salmon rivers, and the Fraser River's "most significant" quality 
related to "the salmon populations it supports."''
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A COHESIVE PROVINCIAL FISHERIES STRATEGY
In September 1995, senior officials in the province's Ministry 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) incorporated all of the 
government's habitat protection policies under a single, cohesive 
policy framework - the "BC Salmon Habitat Conservation Plan."
This measure symbolized the elevated provincial interest in the 
fishery resource that had emerged out of BC's environmental 
protection policies. As Stuart Culbertson recalls :
We suddenly realized that we had a collage of 
policies designed - in various shapes and forms - to 
preserve salmon habitat. We thought it might be 
expedient .. to combine these into a coordinated 
plan.-"'
The BC Salmon Habitat Conservation Plan declared that the 
province "has a key role to play in the conservation, protection 
and enhancement of salmon stocks and their h a b i t a t ' It went on 
to state that "the British Columbia government has taken action to 
protect fish habitat and water quality through various ministry 
initiatives"”' and referred to policies such as the Forest 
Practices Code, Forest Renewal BC, pulp mill effluent restrictions, 
waste management programs, the cancellation of the Kemano 
Completion Project, BC Heritage Rivers, and others."'' It also 
announced a new directive: the Urban Salmon Habitat Program"'' - a 
program aimed at helping urban communities, groups, and agencies to 
restore and enhance their local salmon streams. The program's 
stated objectives were "to ensure sustainable wild salmon stocks
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and habitats" in the highly urbanized Georgia Basin, and to 
"increase public awareness of salmon and their h a b i t a t s ' The 
fact that the "direct and indirect economic value of the Georgia 
Basin salmon runs is hundreds of millions of dollars" was also 
cited when the program was announced.''" Designed to operate over 
five years, it was initially funded at 512.5 million.'^'
By coordinating and reinterpreting existing and emergent 
(environmental) policies into a cohesive fisheries strategy, the 
province became more interested in and raised its profile in the 
federally controlled fisheries forum. In November 1995, for 
example, during the federal-provincial conference of fisheries 
ministers, comments by the BC fisheries minister indicated that BC 
was willing to make politics out of its emergent interest in the 
salmon resource. At this time a cooperative relationship existed 
between the federal and provincial governments on fisheries issues.
CONCLUSION
This chaprer describes the first factor (provincial interest) 
influencing the Clark's government's transgovernmental policy on 
the PST impasse. It spelled out the process whereby Mike 
Harcourt's government broke with the pro-development legacy of past 
provincial governments and aggressively pursued establishment of a 
provincial environmental protection regime. Many of the policy 
measures that were a part of this environmental regime incorporated
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(or were motivated by) values pertaining to fishery habitat, and 
these elevated the provincial government's "interest" in the 
federally controlled salmon resource. The heightened provincial 
interest in salmon set the groundwork for future transgovernmental 
action on the PST. Before spelling out the province's 
transgovernmental actions, though, it is necessary to examine the 
other major factor that influenced BC's stance - the significant 
decline of provincial confidence in Ottawa's ability to manage the 
west coast salmon fishery. It is to this task that the next 
chapter is devoted.
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CHAPTER 4 -  FACTOR TWO: CONFIDENCE IN FEDERAL 
FISHERIES POLICY
This Chapter examines the other major factor influencing BCs 
transgovernmental policy on the PST issue - the decline in the 
Clark government's confidence regarding Ottawa's ability to manage 
the salmon resource in a manner adherent to the province's best 
interests. What follows is a description of how that decline in 
confidence came about.
While BC's NDP government was busy establishing its 
environmental protection regime - thereby increasing its vested 
interest in the salmon resource - a concurrent series of issues and 
events emerged that raised serious guestions regarding Ottawa's 
capacity to manage (domestically and internationally) the west 
coast fishery. However, it should first be pointed out that 
Ottawa's policies in this sector have long been subject to 
criticism by west coast salmon fishers. Indeed, from BC's 
perspective, a legacy of federal incompetence'" is discernable 
throughout the fishery's 125-year history.'"' During the early 
1990s, however, criticisms of the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans began to occur with increased frequency.
THE EARLY STUART SOCKEYE RUN
In the early 1990s DFO personnel were optimistic regarding the 
plight of BC's major salmon runs. Since the mid to late 1980s 
salmon runs throughout the province were considered "in good
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shape," and the size of the fish returns had "steadily increased" 
to the point where they were assumed to be approaching near record 
sizes.''" Disappointment loomed, however. This began in 1992 with 
the disappearance of significant quantities of fish from the 
valuable Early Stuart River sockeye run. With estimates hovering 
around 700,000, the run had originally been forecast to arrive in
record numbers. When the Early Stuart fish arrived in the Strait
of Juan de Fuca, however, their numbers were drastically under the 
projected estimates. - Indeed, a mere 350,000 fish - half of the 
figure the DFO expected - showed up. As a result, the DFO quickly 
moved to cancel all commercial fisheries targeting Early Stuart 
salmon.' But the problems with the Early Stuart fish did not end 
here - by the time the salmon had traveled into the Fraser River, 
another 116, 000 fish had seemingly disappeared.' ' Ultimately, only 
65,000 fish were able to reach their spawning grounds.''
Many salmon were missing despite the DFO's shutdown of the Early 
Stuart sockeye fishery. This apparent contradiccion spurned a
"storm of protest" from the BC fishing community,' ' and the
question was raised: "where did all rhe fish disappear to?"' ’ The 
fishing community had already made up its mind, though - it was 
Ottawa's Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy that was to blame.'
The Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy was a by-product of the 1990 
Supreme Court of Canada decision on a case known as Regina vs. 
Sparrow.' ' In the spring of 1984, Musqueam band member Ron Sparrow
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was charged for using an illegal net while fishing for salmon in 
the Fraser River. The charges stemmed from the fact that, under 
the Fisheries Act, fishers were restricted to using only drifr nets 
up to 4 6 meters in length (Sparrow's net was 82 meters in length). 
Sparrow defended his actions by arguing that he was merely 
exercising his aboriginal right to fish and, six years later, the 
Supreme Court ruled in his favor stating that aboriginal fishing 
for food and ceremony was a practice protected by the Constitution. 
At the time it was also ruled that after valid conservation 
measures are taken to sustain the fish resource, aboriginal 
fisheries are entitled to take priority over other fisheries, such 
as those for commercial and sporting purposes.
Ottawa promptly initiated an inquiry into the matter of the 
missing Early Stuart fish. Chief investigator Peter Pearse 
subsequently determined that the commercial fishers were correct in 
their assumption that the aboriginal fisheries were to blame. He 
concluded that the DFO's Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy had resulted 
in a 1992 native fishery that was characterized by "unprecedented 
intensity, management confusion, weak surveillance and enforcement, 
and general excess."" BC fishers up and down the coast promptly 
called the federal government's management style "massively 
misdirected""' and their policies woefully "inappropriate."" ' The 
criticisms did not end there. Members of the Fishermen's Survival 
Coalition, consisting of various commercial fishing interests and
66
established to scrutinize DFO policy, demanded the immediate 
resignation of federal Fisheries Minister John Crosbie.’"
MORE MISSING FISH
Yet another dilemma followed the 1992 missing fish fiasco, one 
that served to heighten the lack of confidence among west coast 
fishers when it came to DFO policy-making. In 1994, the DFO 
forecasted that sockeye returns to the Fraser River would total 30 
million fish, even going so far as to make the early claim that the 
runs would be "as strong as they had ever been."""' When test 
fisheries were conducted, though, it quickly became apparent that 
this original DFO estimate was well off its mark. It was 
subsequently revised downward to 19 million""" - a level still 
deemed sufficient to allow the scheduled fishery openings to 
continue. Ultimately, however, when the fish reached their 
spawning grounds, they were well below what were expected, with 
certain runs reaching their lowest levels in over fifty years.""' 
This seemed to re-affirm perceptions among BC fishers that Ottawa 
was demonstratively inept when it came to fulfilling its duties 
pertaining to the management of the west coast fishery, and again 
raised the question "why did the fish disappear?" In an effort tc 
answer the pressing questions surrounding this missing fish issue, 
yet another inquiry was initiated by Ottawa. This time the probe 
was headed by former Tory fisheries minister John Fraser. In his 
final report Fraser determined that several forces had combined to 
deplete the number of fish reaching their spawning grounds.
6 7
One of the main factors, according to Fraser, was the 
disfunctionality of the PST. That year, in the absence of a FST 
fishery regime, Canadian authorities estimated Alaska had 
opportunistically intercepted some 2.28 million coho bound for 
Canadian waters (this figure represents approximately 40 percent of 
the entire Alaskan coho fishery for that year) Interceptions of
other salmon species were deemed to be equally sizeable.'' In an 
effort to try to dissuade the Alaskans from over-fishing Canadian- 
bound salmon in the absence of a workable PST agreement, Ottawa 
opted to pursue an aggressive fishing strategy. This strategy 
entailed that the Canadian salmon fleet engage in particularly 
heavy fishing efforts when the fish moved through Canadian 
territorial waters, essentially ensuring that the Canadians 
received their "fair share" of the salmon runs. At the time this 
tactic was initiated, however, it was unknown to policy-makers that 
the size of the salmon runs had been misjudged and were 
significantly smaller than anticipated. Consequently, the 
aggressive fishing strategy put further pressure on already 
depleted runs of salmon. Once the true size of the salmon runs was 
revealed, the policy was quickly retracted and fisheries were 
closed down. One more 12 hour opening would have eliminated that 
year's Adams River run in its entirety.' The closures resulted in 
losses estimated around $20 million' for EC's commercial fishers 
I a group already reeling from the 1992 stock declines). Fraser 
promptly concluded that the aggressive fishing strategy was deeply
r laweo.
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Fraser's accusations did not end with criticisms of the 
agaressive fishing strategy. In fact, he went on to place further 
blame for the missing fish on federal cost-cutting measures.
Fraser stated that "cutbacks and budget reductions were made to the 
extent that the department was left in charge without clear lines 
of accountability or necessary tools to enforce its regulations 
with any c r e d i b i l i t y H e  also asserted that Ottawa's 
mtismanagement of the in-land aboriginal fishery had (again) figured 
into the negative outcome for the 1994 fishery.'' ' Geoff Meggs 
reflects on Fraser's findings :
By identifying cutbacks and budget reductions as 
part of the problem, Fraser put his finger on just 
one mianifestation of the pro fit-before-conservât ion 
policy which had undermined every aspect of 
fisheries management. That policy had driven the 
Conservatives to sign a salmon treaty with the 
United States which compromised Canada's ability to 
manage its own stocks. It had made property rights 
and protection of capital a priority of fleet 
management rather than conservation and employment. 
It had produced a piecemeal Aboriginal Fishing 
Strategy rather than comprehensive treaties with 
First nations. It had put global trade rules ahead 
of conservation and Canadian jobs. It had guaranteed 
that fish habitat would be sacrificed tc make way 
for development... It had made a holy grail of deficit 
reduction, cutting fisheries department resources so 
drastically that, to cite just one example, no money 
was available to pay for enforcement at night. The 
1994 runs would end up paying the consequences of 
each of these decisions.''
The reaction tc the 1994 fishery problems was frustration and 
anger among EC fishers, and these sentiments were quickly directed 
towards Ottawa. "Mon'umental federal blunders"' ' and "years of 
mismanagement" were deemed to be the heart of the problems
surrounding the west coast fishery, as were "11 consecutive years 
of budget cuts" imposed by the Liberal government on the DFO."' 
These budget reductions created admittedly difficult operating 
conditions for DFO staff, to the point where departmental morale 
had been severely compromised.-'' All these criticisms being 
heaped on the federal fisheries authorities, however, did not 
persuade Ottawa to address the issues at hand. In the words of 
one observer, Ottawa "was not yet prepared to abandon the 
philosophy which had led to the brink of disaster."""’
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL COOPERATION ON THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY
Despite the aforementioned problems and the criticisms directed 
at the DFO's fishery policies, Ottawa's effort to resolve the 
emergent difficulties surrounding the PST were, from the 
provincial government's perspective, still functional. Indeed, at 
least at this point, there seemed to be a cooperative, cohesive, 
and coordinated relationship between Ottawa and BC, Brian Tobin 
and David Zirnhelt on the issue. In June 1994, for example, the 
duo traveled to Washington D.C. in an effort to sway US 
politicians in Canada's direction."" The province also supported 
federal Fisheries Minister Tobin when he later imposed a $1500 
transit lev\" on American fishing vessels moving through BC to 
Alaska."" This cooperative approach to the PST problem continued 
through 1995. That year the two levels of government worked 
closely tc devise Canada-first (unilateral) fishing plans," and 
held a joint news conference in Seattle in an effort to bolster
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oublie opinion (both American and Canadian) in Canada's favor.'' 
Zirnhelc and Tobin also ventured to New York to voice their 
concerns about US over fishing, this time addressing delegates of 
the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks.'" The 
fact that there was cooperation between the levels of government 
was evident, and it was noted that "Zirnhelt has remained 
foursquare behind Mr. Tobin in the letter's sabre-rattling with 
the Alaskans.'"' The provincial minister's own comments affirm 
that, at least at this point, his government was confident in the 
leadership Ottawa was providing on the PST.'' ' Zirnhelt states 
that :
I felt that Tobin was not afraid to deviate from the 
broader objectives of the federal government in order 
to protect EC's interests. He appeared to take pride 
in countering the Americans. In one instance the 
Department of Foreign Affairs tried to exclude BC 
representatives from attending meetings with American 
representatives, and he went against their wishes by 
insisting that we be present at the table. All in 
all, I felt we had a solid working relationship with 
Tobin, and that was key to keeping things together.''
FURTHER DECLINES IN DFO CREDIBILITY
After consecutive, disastrous salmon fishing seasons, and with 
public scrutiny increasingly directed towards the federal 
government, the last thing the Ottawa needed was to upset the 
province's remaining confidence in Ottawa's fisheries leadership.
In early 1996, however, it became apparent that Ottawa was oblivious 
to this exigency. Word was spreading throughout the fishing 
community that Ottawa, instead of pursuing the Americans more
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vigorously on the PST issue, would soon be moving ~o reorganize one 
west coast fishery through reductions in the site of ohe salmon 
fleet.' This controversial policy move, however, was not the work 
of Brian Tobin (who, from EC's perspective, was one of the only 
remaining reasons to maintain a tolerable level of confidence in 
Ottawa's ability to manage the west coast fishery). Instead, it was 
the workings of a new federal fisheries minister - Fred Mifflin. He 
quickly revealed to BC that he lacked the commitment and resolve of 
his predecessor.'' According to Zirnhelt, Mifflin promptly acquired 
"a reputation of thinking that British Columbia consisted solely of 
the 10 square miles around the Vancouver airport,"' and he "became 
notorious for landing at Vancouver International, giving a 20 minute 
speech, then flying back east immediately afterward."'' He also 
recalls that the new federal minister demonstrated a "remote and 
piecemeal approach to fisheries management."' The comments of 
Stuart Culbertson, then BC's Assistant Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, affirm that the province's faith in 
Ottawa's leadership waned after Mifflin assumed the portfolio. He 
states that "Before Mifflin, there was a good working relationship 
between Tobin and Zirnhelt. Unlike Mifflin, Tobin was not afraid tc 
defend BC's interests."' Clearly, the confidence that BC had thus 
far maintained when it came to Ottawa's leadership on fishery issues 
had, by this point, declined considerably.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter chronicled BC's declining confidence in Ottawa's 
ability tc manage the salmon resource. Problems relating to its 
domestic and international fisheries policies detracted from the 
already tenuous provincial support for Ottawa's authority on 
fisheries issues. This was exacerbated by Mifflin's "remote and 
piecemeal" approach to the west coast fishery, and the developing 
controversy over his yet to be tabled fleet reduction initiative. 
This initiative was, in essence, "the last straw" that broke rhe 
province's remaining confidence in Ottawa's ability to provide 
effective leadership and policy in the fisheries sector. Confidence 
deteriorated even further after the arrival of a new premier. In 
the next chapter the manner by which BC's transgovernmental policy 
emerged and unfolded for the newly elected Clark government is 
discussed.
CHAPTER 5 -  TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM AND THE PST
The preceding chaprers have spelled out the two main factors 
influencing the Clark government to adopt: an autonomous, 
transgovernmental policy on the PST issue. To reiterate, these are 
the increased provincial interest in the salmon resource istemming 
from the establishment of a provincial environmental protection 
regime), and the substantial reduction of provincial confidence in 
Ottawa's ability to manage the fishery at both the domestic and 
international level. The manner in which these factors influenced 
Clark's transgovernmental fisheries policy is explained below.
?. MEW PST STPATEGY FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA
In February 1996 an event occurred that would prove critical in 
changing the federal-provincial dynamics surrounding the west coaso 
salmon fishery and the PST. On the 22nd day of that month, 
following a weekend leadership convention, former provincial Finance 
Minister Glen Clark was sworn in as the new BC premier (replacing 
Mike Harccurt). As Richard Sigurdson observes, Clark quickly "set 
about distinguishing himself" as a "young, dynamic, scrappy partisan 
who gives every impression that he is firmly at the helm.." ' This 
brazen, bellicose, and often controversial political style would 
soon spill over into the increasingly contentious fisheries sector, 
the result of which would be the emergence of an independent, 
transaovernmental fisheries oolicv for BC.
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Clark assumed rhe leadership of a governmenr nearing rhe end cf 
irs 5-year mandare and was faced with a decidedly unreceprive 
electorate. This was, however, exactly what confronted Glen Clark 
when he became premier. Consequently, Clark, his cabinet, and an 
entourage of senior NDP strategists promptly held meetings to devise 
a plan that would improve the government's popularity and establish 
its policy priorities. Such a plan would necessarily aim to convey 
to the public that the new administration was in control, not only 
of its own agenda, but also the economy, the environment, and other 
issues of primary public concern.
In late February 1996, during one of the aforementioned strategy 
meetings, the issue of the PST was brought to the table by Dave 
Zirnhelt, then Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food. He 
relayed, in detail, the circumstances surrounding the PST and the 
west coast fishery. To the minister, it seemed clear that Ottawa's 
domestic and international fisheries policies had become 
increasingly problematic and, since Mifflin had assumed the 
portfolio, there was now little reason to remain confident in 
Ottawa's representation of the provincial interest in the salmon 
resource land, thereby, in the PST issue). He explained to the 
premier that it would be wise for BC to chart its own policy course 
on the PST, and that such a move might assist in the aforementioned 
strategical context. Zirnhelt reflects on this meeting:
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I realized we had an issue of some substance and 
utility here, one that we could possibly appropriate 
in a politically-beneficial manner. I explained to 
Glen that this was something that he could run with.
This was the first time the matter was discussed at 
that level ... in an explicitly strategic context.'
Thus, it became apparent that by adopting an independent stance on 
the PST province could simultaneously address Ottawa's shortcomings 
in this policy sector and defend the heightened provincial interest 
in the salmon resource. In the process of doing so, it would also 
contribute to improving the popularity of the Premier and his 
government.
Clark was highly receptive to the PST strategy for which his 
cabinet minister was "very supportive" of the government 
pursuing, and he promptly set about incorporating it into his 
political strategy. The remainder of this chapter will outline the 
manner by which this transgovernmental strategy on the PST issue 
emerged and unfolded after February 1996.
THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY AND THE FAILURE OF MEDIATION
Earlier, in the summer of 1995, with the dysfunctional 
provisions of the PST clearly incapable of bringing the two parties 
to consensus, the US and Canadian governments had agreed to a 
mediation process aimed at resolving the dispute. On August 25 it 
was announced that Christopher Beeby - former New Zealand 
Ambassador to France - would begin mediating the matter in October
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with the intent of concluding the process by December.'" His 
specific agenda was:
.. to assist Canada and the United States in finding 
a solution to the problems that have been 
encountered in implementing the PST, which entered 
into force in 1985. While the mediation will have no 
binding effect, both governments are hopeful that 
this process will enable them to overcome past 
differences and to fulfill the promise of the Treaty 
to rebuild west coast salmon stocks and to provide 
to both sides the benefits of their salmon 
production.
Unfortunately Beeby did not accurately assess the monumental 
difficulty of the task that confronted him. His proposals, which 
were (privately) presented to the parties i.i January 1996, sided 
with Canada's view that its fishers were being shortchanged,and 
suggested an accounting formula that would force the US to curtail 
its fishing or pay Canada cash as compensation. However, 
according to Canadian officials, the US delegation privately 
refused to accede to the proposal and eventually dismissed the 
mediated recommendations. Beeby was extremely frustrated with 
the intractable stance of the US negotiators, and he subsequently 
resigned as mediator in March 1996.''
BC'S TBANSGOVERNMENTAIISM ON THE PST ISSUE
In March 1996, in anticipation of Canadian action on the PST 
stalemate in the upcoming fishing season, the US Congress asserted 
that international law guaranteed American fishing vessels free 
access to waters within BC's Inside Passage. Congress also
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demanded chat American fishers be reimbursed for the 3300,000 they 
paid in transit fees levied against them during the 1995 fishing 
season.' Clearly the Americans were eager to assure that Canada
authorities would not interfere with the movement of its commercial
fishing vessels during the 1996 season.
The Clark government, with its new fisheries strategy now in 
place, reacted swiftly, angrily, and very publicly to the 
Americans' demands for reimbursement. Not only did the premier 
call on Ottawa to re-impose the transit fee, he also went so far as 
to engage himself and his government in the "high politics" of
territorial sovereignty.'" "We must be firm, we cannot tolerate US
legislation that attempts to reach into BC .. this has to be taken 
very seriously," said the new premier.'"' Clark and United 
Fisheries and Allied Workers Union fUF.AWU) Vice President Dennis 
Brown also deemed Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd A:<wcrthy to be 
"terrified" of the Americans, '"" and NDP cabinet minister Moe Sihota 
privately reflected that Ottawa was engaged in a form of 
"submissive diplomacy"" '" with its American counterparts. These 
confrontational accusations were not lost on the Federal 
representatives. David Anderson, Minister of Transport, responded 
by stating that Clark was "jumping the gun," " and Lloyd A:-:worthy 
defined the premier's bellicosity as potentially "damaging."'"
Clearly, tensions on the PST issue were beginning to rise. For 
advice on this matter, Clark turned to the former federal fisheries
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minisrer Brian Tobin, the man whose proactive approach- tc rhe PST 
problem had previously won and maintained the province's support.
On March 12, 1996 Clark placed a telephone call to Tobin (who was 
now the Premier of Newfoundland) to beg his advice on how to handle 
the Americans' reaction to the transit fee threat. Clark reflects 
on the response he received from Tobin: "Brian Tobin proved how 
important it is that Canada stand up to Americans or anyone else 
who want to attack us on our sovereignty .. He encouraged me to be 
strong when it comes to dealing with the Americans."
BC'S RESPONSE TO THE MIFFLIN PLAN
On 2 9 March 1996, in a move already anticipated'■ by the Clark 
government, federal fisheries minister Fred Mifflin announced that 
the west coast fishing fleet was being cut in half under the terms 
of the new "Fleet Revitalization Program."'"' The rationale offered 
was that the salmon were in desperate need of protection from fleet 
over-capacity, and that such a move was essential to restore the 
ailing stocks."' The federal fisheries minister's plan did not 
resonate favorably with BC's fishing interests. Indeed, the 
reaction was negative in the extreme. UFAWU Vice President Dennis 
Brown, for instance, called it "human bludgeoning" " and circulated 
to industry officials a letter of petition calling for Ottawa to 
issue a moratorium on the plan."' Environmental groups referred to 
the policy as "draconian.""' UBC fisheries Professor Carl Walters 
drew similarities between the plan and one previously proposed by
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Ottawa in the 1960s under Jack Davis' leadership, stating that it 
would have similarly "catastrophic consequences."
Glen Clark's transgovernmental policy surrounding the Pacific 
salmon fishery solidified through the spring of 1996. Mifflin's 
announcement that the DFO was moving to restructure the salmon 
fishing fleet prompted angry words from the premier. Clark called 
the federal government's policies with respect to the province's 
salmon fishery a "failure" and the Mifflin Plan's compensation 
package an "insult.""' He also contended that Ottawa had given BC 
"the back of their hand ... anytime an East Coast fishery is in 
jeopardy, they have moved significantly." Zirnhelt subsequently 
bolstered Clark's accusations, stating that "the salmon problem 
stems from a long history of poor federal fisheries management.""
CLARK RAISES THE ANTE
BC's faith in Ottawa's fisheries and PST policy had clearly
deteriorated. Indeed, there was little confidence that Ottawa
could pressure Americans into accepting a new PST agreement.
Acknowledging that the fishery was federal responsibility, and
arguing that Ottawa had neglected to fulfill its obligations to
devise effective fisheries policy for BC, the premier hinted that
his government was "preparing to take action" that involved
(unilateral) plans aimed at bringing the Americans into compliance
with the PST." This led one reporter to comment "heavens knows
what that means - unilateral action by BC, federal jurisdiction be
damned, to stop Alaskan over fishing?"'" The premier subsequently
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demanded a meeting with Prime Minister Chretien and a seat at the 
Canada-US negotiating table on the PST."'"
From a provincial perspective the federal government had proven 
that it could not adequately manage the salmon fishery in the best 
interests of BC. Ottawa had encountered numerous, highly 
publicized and consecutive policy problems in this sector, 
including its inability to reign-in the over-fishing Americans. 
Consequently, in the months leading up to the provincial election 
- held on May 28, 1996 - Clark moved to solidify his 
controversial, confrontational, and transgovernmental approach to 
the fisheries dilemma. This began on April 19, 1996 when the 
premier released an "action plan" aimed at resolving the matter 
or, depending one's perspective, promoting confrontation. He 
declared that in order to expedite a workable salmon treaty his 
government would adopt its own course of action aimed at bringing 
the Americans into compliance. First, he threatened"’’ to cancel 
the US lease on the Nanoose Bay torpedo testing range."- Then, in 
conjunction with BC fishing groups, the premier sent a letter tc 
the Prime Minister in which he criticized Ottawa as hypocritical 
for cutting back the size of BC's salmon fleet while 
simultaneously allowing US fishers to harvest BC salmon."’' It was 
further asserted that "if the Americans will not act as good 
neighbors .. Canada must demonstrate that there are 
consequences ."
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Ottawa did not receive Clark's threat favorably. Foreign 
Affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy said the premier's stance was 
"irresponsible" and "grandstanding," and that he was "treading in 
very dangerous waters" by "linking issues related to fisheries tc 
other issues."'’' These allegations were, however, quickly 
countered by the truculent Clark. "We're not going to sit back 
and let the federal government mismanage our fish stocks the way 
they have on the east coast ... I believe this is an appropriate and 
prudent response and will get the attention of the Americans," 
said the premier.'’' Meanwhile, the linkages the province was 
making between Ottawa's failures in the fisheries sector and the 
province's salmon habitat protection policies were clearly 
acknowledged in the Clark government's first throne speech:
There is another resource that requires urgent 
attention. Like our forests, thousands of BC 
families rely on it for employment. Like our 
forests, it is very much a part of our history and 
identity as British Columbians ... this resource is 
in imminent danger of disappearing for generations 
tc come ... I speak of Pacific Salmon - a living 
symbol of British Columbian identity. My government 
is committed ro a comprehensive program to protect 
our salmon. This government has introduced new 
pollution control rules, worked with communities to 
rehabilitate salmon habitat, invested in sewage 
treatment, and cancelled the Kemano completion 
Project because it threatened a vital salmon river 
... Ottawa's plan to cut fishing licenses is an 
affront to BC's fishers ... (Ottawa) must tell the 
Americans that if the US is unwilling to conclude an 
agreement that puts conservation first, they will 
face consequences. We are determined not tc fail.'’
82
BC FURTHER POLITICIZES THE SALMON ISSUE
As spring turned to summer in 1996, the provincial attack on 
both Ottawa and the United States escalated. The premier stated 
that "British Columbians have lost faith in Ottawa's ability and 
Ottawa's political will to do whatever it takes to keep BC's 
fisheries alive and healthy.""’" On the same day the premier 
announced the creation of a new crown corporation - "Fisheries 
Renewal BC.""’" The mandate new crown agency was consistent with 
the province's emergent fisheries policy. It was to "lead the 
fishery out of this crisis to a new, more sustainable future" 
because the people of BC have "lost confidence" in Ottawa's 
ability to do so. " Fisheries Renewal BC would also aim to 
"conserve fish and maximize jobs" by using a "comprehensive and 
strategic vision" to "turn the tide on decades of ad hoc decision­
making by Ottawa.""'"
The Fisheries Renewal plan was complemented by other actions on 
the fisheries front. In late May the province joined with members 
of the Pacific Salmon Alliance and other interest groups to seek a 
court injunction against the Mifflin Plan."" Then, in July, the 
premier requested that Doug Kerley - BC's Job Protection 
Commissioner - assess the potential economic impacts of the 
Mifflin Plan for coastal communities.’" Clearly, Glen Clark was 
moving fast-forward in his effort to portray Ottawa as being 
"decidedly bureaucratic, controversial, and at best.
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schizophrenic" in its approach to west coast fisheries policy and 
the PST."’
STAFFING THE PREMIER'S OFFICE
Towards the end of summer in 1996, the premier began to staff 
his office with experienced fisheries experts.'"’ The first 
notable appointment came in August when Stuart Culbertson, an 
individual with a strong background in fisheries issues and 
international law, was appointed head of the BC Fisheries 
Secretariat. Culbertson's duty was to oversee this new office and 
its scaff of 10 while adhering to its objective to "pursue a more 
meaningful role for the province in fisheries."
On September 12 Dennis Brown, former member of the Pacific 
Salmon Commission, Vice President of the UFAWU and an avowed 
critic of the DFO, was named the premier's "Special Advisor" on 
the PST." Then, on September 19, Geoff Meggs, the former UFAWU 
administrator and fisheries author, was hired on as Clark's 
personal Communications Director.'"' Indeed, by surrounding 
himself with a "cadre of senior advisors""" with distinctive 
fisheries expertise, Clark was providing clear indication that the 
smoldering PST issue - and the province's approach tc this impasse 
- would emerge as a vanguard for his administration. Moreover, as 
Norm Ruff states, this staffing would assist the premier in 
"ensuring that his office would remain the nerve centre of the 
government and that he would have as staff and close advisors men
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and women with political and administrative expertise" in an issue 
area that he chose to elevate and pursue."'"
Meanwhile, the premier and his fisheries cohorts continued to 
take an independent approach towards addressing the matter of the 
US over-fishing of Canadian-bound salmon. In mid-September, for 
example, (and without consulting Ottawa) Clark sent a letter to 
the governors of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon encouraging them 
to cooperate in an effort to curb the Alaskan take of BC salmon."' 
Indeed, it was now evident that "the government's efforts in the 
fisheries sector were being directly driven by the premier's
THE ELEVATION OF DISCONTENT
As 1997 began, all indications were that BC would continue to 
disregard Ottawa's authority on salmon fishery issues. In early 
January the premier sent provincial fisheries minister Corky Evans 
on a tour of coastal fishing communities. The purpose of his trip 
was ro rally support for the Fisheries Renewal Plan and to field 
concerns about the Mifflin Plan.""" Shortly after this tour, Evans 
declared that the "made-in-Ottawa approach is killing jobs and 
destroying communities" and there was a subsequent "need for a 
made-in-BC approach to fisheries management." He also issued a 
statement explicitly attacking the DFO: "what I heard was the 
people who built this industry are worried that their work will be
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undermined ... because of mismanagement from 5 000 kilometers away in 
O t t a w a ■
At the end of January 1997, with the fishing season fast 
approaching and Ottawa still seemingly incapable of resolving the 
PST impasse, the premier again stepped into the fray by chastising 
both the Americans and Ottawa. Speaking at the UFAWU annual 
general meeting, Clark threatened his government would act 
unilaterally to create "an international incident" if the dispute 
was not resolved by March 15.'" Later (in February) while 
Canadian and American negotiators met in Portland, Oregon, the 
premier again reiterated his pessimistic view that the process was 
doomed to failure. "We are watching this process and the March 15 
deadline is a real deadline," Clark declared. "We simply can't 
tolerate just continuing to talk about this when certain salmon 
runs in British Columbia could become extinct because of Alaskan 
over-fishing."" In his continued efforts to forge a role for 
himself and his government on the PST issue, Clark even went so 
far as to place direct pressure on the Prime Minister. In mid- 
February, the premier announced that he fully expected Chretien to 
raise the matter with US President Bill Clinton.''
In March, during the throne speech, the centrality of the 
fisheries issue to the Clark government, and the immanency of 
provincial transgovernmental action, was confirmed. However,
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there were also indications that BC had not yet entirely abandoned 
the notion of cooperating with Ottawa on the issue:
My government intends .. to ensure a future for the 
Pacific salmon, a resource that has nourished 
countless generations among BC's first nations and 
coastal communities. My government is ready to work 
with the federal administration or, if necessary, to 
take direct provincial action to ensure our salmon 
can return to our rivers and streams. '
Indeed, it did appear as though Clark was willing to tone down his 
stance and "work with" the federal government on the PST issue.
This was evident in April when the province and Ottawa signed the 
"Canada-BC Agreement on the Management of Pacific Salmon Fishery 
Issues." Acting as "a framework for better salmon management in 
BC," this agreement amounted to an attempt by federal authorities 
to placate the province's concerns surrounding Canada's approach to 
the PST problem and other west coast fisheries issues.'" ' It states 
that "no major decision on salmon will be made without the active 
involvement of the BC government."'-
The agreement did appear to quell the province's concerns 
regarding the PST over the short-term, but Clark continued to take 
a proactive stance in promoting his government's fisheries policies 
at the provincial level. One month after signing the agreement 
with Ottawa, for example, the premier unveiled the "BC Fisheries 
Strategy" which sought to "provide a substantive vision for 
collective efforts towards fisheries renewal and the leadership
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that is needed to ensure a bright future for BC's salmon 
fishery."' This policy - yet another attempt to coalesce the 
province's initiatives in the fisheries sector - went so far as to 
assign an explicit dollar value to its fisheries habitat protection 
efforts. It was estimated that between 1996 and 1997 provincial 
funding for fish habitat increased more than "four-fold, from $23 
million .. to nearly $103 million." The BC Fisheries Strategy 
also marked the introduction of the "Fish Protection Act" - 
legislation intended to reflect the "government's continued 
commitment to environmental protection" by providing "powerful 
tools to protect water flows and habitat needs for fish."'’
THE LONG, HOT SUMMER OF 19 97
Up until this point, the Clark government's pugnacity towards 
both Ottawa and Americans was rhetorical. The province had not yet 
taken overt, transgovernmental actions. This situation, however, 
changed dramatically over the summer of 1997.
The first change came in late May when bilateral negotiations to 
resolve the PST impasse again failed.'' The defiant Clark reacted 
by stating "stronger action is not only required, but absolutely 
necessary" and both Ottawa and the Americans can "expect BC to take 
unilateral action."' He continued to say that "Canada has drifted 
for three years without concluding this treaty and now we have poor 
leverage on the Americans."'' The unilateral action the premier 
referred to was the cancellation of the American lease on the
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Nanoose Bay facility - a move he confirmed was again under serious 
consideration." " And the premier acted quickly on this threat. On 
May 22, 1997 the province formally served 90-day notice to Ottawa 
that it would end the Nanoose seabed lease agreement."" Strong 
words, it seemed, had now morphed into transgovernmental action.
The province's decision to serve notice on the seabed lease 
agreement seemed to be an effective maneuver. Just hours after 
Clark announced this action, the American representatives agreed rc 
return to the bargaining table with an explicit mandate to 
negotiate a new PST arrangement.""* Said Clark of the Americans' 
sudden conciliation: "Clearly it's the result of putting some 
pressure on Canada and the United States."""* The response Clark 
received from BC fishers was entirely supportive, and they cheered 
loudly when the premier announced his actions at a False Creek 
rally.Speaking in the BC Legislature on a Motion Without 
Notice, Clark rationalized the move to cancel the Nanoose lease, 
citing both BC's increased investment (i.e. interest) in the 
resource and its symbolic nature:
Conservation of our Pacific salmon .. It's a symbol 
of our province's riches and ... strong 
environmental stewardship .. We've taken a series of 
initiatives to deal with that resource... All of it 
means nothing if we don't have a Pacific Salmon 
Treaty. Because if we don't have a Pacific Salmon 
Treaty and the Americans can catch fish raised in 
British Columbia in our waters, it means, in fact, 
the conservation is for naught; it means that those 
jobs are jeopardized; and it means that the 
investment we're making is not for our benefit but 
for the benefit of another country. """
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Deeming the Nanoose threat by itself to be inadequate, the 
premier continued his defiant actions into the summer. A shorn rwc 
weeks after threatening to cancel the Nanoose lease, Clark pulled 
BC's representatives from the Pacific Northwest Economic Region 
conference. "Until we see cooperation in the form of a renewed 
salmon treaty ... we are not prepared to cooperate in other areas" 
said Clark.''"" Then, in early July, the province began to run ads 
in the Washington State media. These ads stated that US officials 
had failed to match BC's efforts to conserve the fragile Pacific 
salmon fishery, and urged American citizens to complain to cheir 
state and federal representatives. Furthermore, when refusing 
requests from Ottawa to drop the Nanoose lease cancellation, Clark 
stated that he "finds it inconceivable that the federal government 
of Canada would side with the United States.""" BC's position was 
bolstered by the fact that premiers from other western provinces 
declared themselves to be supportive of Clark's stance.'"' Clearly, 
the premier and his fisheries advisers were moving full-steam ahead 
in their attempts tc defy Ottawa and directly pursue the Americans 
on the PST matter.
In mid-July 1997, Glen Clark further affirmed that his 
government was more than willing to defend its interests in the 
salmon resource. With no workable treaty arrangements in place at 
the beginning of the fishing season allegations quickly arose from 
the BC camp that the Alaskans had taken advantage of the situation 
by harvesting half a million Canadian sockeye (under the original
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rreaty arrangements the Alaskans were only allocated 120,000 of 
these valuable fish)."“ In response to these allegations Clark 
declared "a full-scale fish war," ' and contended that "the silence 
from Ottawa is deafening. The gloves are off - there has to be some 
response.""'* The premier also fired an open letter off to 
President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Chretien, within which he 
scathingly criticized the Americans for over-fishing and urged the 
two leaders to intervene to resolve the matter.""*
Meanwhile, tempers flared among BC fishers, and on July 19 they 
took action. At that time the Alaskan tourist ferry "Malaspina" - 
which shuttles tourists between Juneau (Alaska) and Prince Rupert - 
was surrounded and blockaded by a 300-vessel strong armada of BC 
fishing boats."" The fishers sought support from the premier - not 
Ottawa. Clark did not disappoint. The premier was seen as 
"sympathetic" tc the fishers' cause, as he "attacked both the 
U.S. and Ottawa for inaction in the continuing fish war.""" He 
also stated that British Columbians prefer he "stand firm" on the 
side of the fishers, and went on to say:
We have not got a treaty for four years now. Now 
it's reached a crisis point. The people in Prince 
Rupert, the fishermen, the people whose livelihood 
depends upon this resource, are all being threatened 
because of the failure of the Canadian government to 
get a treaty. So not doing anything isn't really an 
option in my view.""'
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CLARK CONTINUES TO POLITICIZE THE SALMON ISSUE
The latter half of 1997 saw a continuation of the Clark 
government's confrontational actions and words regarding the PST.
In September the province made public the findings of a legal 
opinion it had solicited from Dr. Alan Beesley, a renowned Canadian 
expert on international law. Beesley's report indicated that 
Alaskan claims to BC fish under their "pasturage"'' concept was 
"unfounded and legally frivolous" and should thereby be rejected."' 
Shortly thereafter, the province aligned with the UFAWU to launch a 
joint legal suit in the U.S. District Court seeking to require the 
American fishers to adhere to the PST's principles and to provide 
financial compensation for past over fishing of BC salmon.
Towards the end of 1997 it become clear that Americans were 
growing tired of the premier's confrontational stance. In October, 
for example, Mary Beth West - the US negotiator on the PST - 
publicly questioned whether or not the treaty served any utility at 
all for her country, and that American fishers would perhaps be 
better off if they were free to fish without the constraints of a 
formal sharing agreement."
The now familiar tensions between BC, Ottawa, and the United 
States continued into 1998. The year began with the province 
sponsoring a series of prime-time television programs expanding 
upon the government's initiatives to protect the salmon, and 
linking saving fish with job protection in coastal communities. ■* ‘
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In February, the Clark administration further prioritized the 
fisheries issue by establishing a freestanding Ministry of 
Fisheries aimed at mitigating "the impacts of federal restructuring 
in the commercial fishing industry on the lives of thousands of 
people and their c o m m u n i t i e s T h e n ,  in May, the premier 
recalled EC's representatives from PST talks, showing again that he 
would not allow EC's fishing interests to be sold out by Ottawa.’ 
Federal Fisheries minister David Anderson reflects on Clark's 
actions :
Clark had an inability to understand that pulling 
out of negotiations was a step far backwards. Given 
that the EC NDP were aligned with integral Canadian 
fishing interests - commercial interests - I wanted 
that representation at the table.""*
Then, at the annual first ministers' conference held that June 
in Calgary, Clark made a rather off-handed and unrealistic $700 
million offer to take-over jurisdiction for the salmon fishery from 
Ottawa."' As Clark himself later reflected, "I also felt that if 
jurisdiction were moved to the province and if this were part of 
future constitutional discussions it might have encouraged EC to be 
more generous to other regions of the country."*
In June 1998 the province released a document titled "Save 
Salmon EC." It placed blame" for the salmon crisis at the feet of 
the federal government, and demanded that Ottawa devote a 
corresponding measure of attention and funding to EC fisheries as 
had been afforded to the east ooast fisheries." The ire of the
93
province and BC fishers was significantly elevated when (with 
little or no consultation’”') the federal government reached a one- 
year agreement with Washington State over the sharing of the Fraser 
River sockeye run.’" Meanwhile, pundits observed that Clark's 
"summer salmon routine" was now "wearing thin"’" on British 
Columbians and Ottawa. The premier persisted in his efforts 
though, not only by reiterating his threat to cancel the Nanoose 
lease but also by taking his fisheries advisors (and a contingent 
of lower mainland media) on a flight over the BC-Alaska ocean 
border where American fishers could be observed catching salmon 
bound for BC waters.’"
As the summer of 1998 drew to a close, the province continued 
its defiant stance against Ottawa and the US. In August, Victoria 
issued yer another scathing critique of DFO policy on the PST. In 
it Clark charged that David Anderson has "negotiated away our 
ability to conserve endangered salmon. He has completely shut down 
British Columbia's fishery at the same time he has agreed ro allow 
the Americans to continue fishing."’"' Clark simultaneously 
revealed that provincial counsel would be proceeding with legal 
action against the United States for violation of the PST’"’ - a 
move that Anderson promptly refused to support."' Furthermore, 
acting on the resurgent anti-DFO sentiment among fishers, the 
province announced it was considering buying the west coast salmon 
fleet and leasing it back to BC fishers."" It was also announced 
that Clark had appointed former Newfoundland Premier Brian Peckford
9 4
to inquire into the rationale leading to the DFO's decision to 
close the Fraser River fishery.’* Political commentators observed 
that Peckford's inquiry was not only a "kangaroo court,"’**
" flagrantly wasting taxpayers"’*’ money, but also that he was being 
used as a "political pawn"’" in Clark's efforts to embarrass Ottawa 
and the federal fisheries minister.
To nobody's surprise, Peckford's interim report asserted that 
the 1998 west coast fishery had been poorly managed by the federal 
government. He declared that fishers felt "betrayed," "angry," and 
"desperate."’** This affirmed the premier's belief that the DFO had 
implemented an "over-zealous preservation policy" that ignored the 
valuable, first-hand knowledge of local fishers.’** Again, with 
Peckford's claims against the DFO, the province was continuing in 
its efforts to build a transgovernmental fisheries policy on 
perceptions that Ottawa's fishery management practices were myopic 
and insensitive to EC's interests. Some observers thought this 
might be a successful strategy.’*'
Early in 1999, prior to the resumption of bilateral discussions 
with the United States, senior officials from BC and Ottawa held 
high-level meetings aimed at resolving their differences regarding 
the PST. These efforts were unsuccessful. To the chagrin of 
Anderson's team, and despite Clark's own public statement that he 
accepted "some of the responsibility for the deterioration of the 
relationship with the federal government,"’*'^ the premier refused to
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back down on his threat to use the Nanoose issue as leverage to 
secure better treaty arrangements.’"' The federal government, 
however, maintained that Clark's use of Nanoose as a bargaining 
chip was a "serious problem."Consequently, after BC rejected an 
offer to lease the facility for $125 million over 30 years, Ottawa 
initiated legal proceedings to expropriate’" the land, and forbid 
the province from partaking in bilateral negotiations to renew the 
PST.’"' Seemingly, Ottawa had grown tired of the premier's 
confrontational, independent, transgovernmental stance, and thus 
took more decisive action aimed at clipping the premier's 
international wings.
In response to Ottawa's decision to expropriate the land at 
Nanoose, the province began to spin the matter into one pertaining 
to nuclear warheads and environmental security. Clark attacked 
both Anderson and Ottawa for not heeding the interests of British 
Columbians when it came to guaranteeing that nuclear warheads not 
be allowed on the test site. Said the premier of the federal 
government, "they would rather expropriate the exclusive 
jurisdiction in order to allow Americans to carry nuclear warheads 
in British Columbia waters."’"' Ottawa quickly countered this line 
of attack. Defense minister Art Eggleton rebutted that the 
continued operation of the Nanoose facility was essential in terms 
of Canada's international obligations. ’ ' He also explained that 
his government had turned to expropriation only as a last resort 
after it had become clear that the province would not cease to link
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its efforts on fisheries matters to Nanoose.’"" David Anderson 
simultaneously claimed that, by picking a fight with Ottawa and the 
Americans, Clark was attempting to deflect attention away from 
other negative issues plaguing his government.’
The outcome of Glen Clark's haphazard foray into the 
international realm did not favour the province or its premier. On 
September 13, 1999, after holding a series of public hearings’"' on 
the matter, Ottawa confirmed that it would fulfill its intentions 
to expropriate the seabed at Nanoose.’"’ Subsequently, on January 
20, 2000, after numerous appeals by the province, the Federal Court 
of Appeal decreed that objections to the expropriation had been 
sufficiently heard by the courts, that any further appeals would be 
moot, and that the expropriation was finalized.’"' Ultimately, this 
sequence of events served to remove BC's primary point of leverage 
when it came to pushing the Americans into compliance with the 
terms of the PST, and bypassing Ottawa's authority on this matter. 
It also undermined the efforts of the Clark administration to 
politicize the matter, and thereby reap the political benefits of 
engaging in a two-front, David versus Goliath transgovernmental 
conflict.
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CHAPTER 6 -  DISCUSSION
The preceding chapters analyzed the Clark government's 
transgovernmental fisheries policy as it pertained to the 
dysfunctional PST agreement. By studying the actions of the Clark 
government surrounding this matter, this thesis has confirmed its 
earlier assertion that increased "interest" and declined 
"confidence" are the dominant factors explaining EC's fisheries 
policy.
Comments by the Premier himself lend further credence to this 
statement. With regard to the first factor (increased interest), 
Clark recalls "it was clear to me that it was good politics for us 
to connect these issues and pursue the PST," and that doing so would 
be "standing up for British C o l u m b i a H e  reflects that his 
government's PST policy "was a logical extension of our 
environmental policies He also acknowledges the emergent
provincial interest in salmon, as it relates to BC's investments in 
fish habitat:
Pacific salmon ... It's a symbol of our province's 
riches and ... strong environmental stewardship ... 
We've taken a series of initiatives to deal with that 
resource ... All of it means nothing if we don't have 
a Pacific Salmon Treaty. Because if we don't have a 
Pacific Salmon Treaty and the Americans can catch fish 
raised in British Columbia in our waters, it means, in 
fact, the conservation is for naught; it means that 
those jobs are jeopardized; and it means that the 
investment we're making is not for our benefit but for 
the benefit of another countrv.’’"
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Dave Zirnhelt also recognized that the province's environmental 
protection regime was the foundation of BC's fisheries policy. He 
states that the government considered its "collage of policies 
designed ... to preserve salmon habitat" when it opted to combine 
these policies into a "coordinated plan" which ultimately led to its 
stance on the PST.
Other comments by the Premier's verify that the second factor 
(decreased confidence) was also a central component of his 
government's fisheries policy. Clark states that he felt obligated 
to "protect salmon from both Ottawa's incompetence and the 
Americans' disregard for a legitimate international agreement,""" 
and also admits his belief that "the federal government cared little 
about BC fisheries and their record had been a bad one."” He 
described their policy approach as "ad hoc,"” * that the federal 
government wasn't listening”" to BC's concerns, and had given BC 
"the back of their hand"”*' when it came to provincial fisheries 
interests. As a result, Clark declared that British Columbians had 
"lost faith in Ottawa's abilit/' to manage the fishery."” These 
realizations led his government to conclude BC should "play a 
greater role in managing its fisheries," and help to "reverse the 
decline in coastal fishing communities" wrought by a legacy of 
poorly contrived fisheries policy."”
Commentary by other observers of and players in BC's salmon war 
validate the Premier's assertions that "declining confidence" was
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integral in shaping the Clark government's refusal to allow "Ottawa 
the privilege of quiet diplomacy in dealing with the Americans on 
the treaty."”' For instance, BC's Deputy Minister of Fisheries 
stated "Ottawa did not seem prepared to take the necessary measures 
to bring the Americans into compliance with the PST agreement” 
Dave Zirnhelt noted that "the salmon problem stems from a long 
history of poor federal fisheries management,"’’' and that Ottawa's 
fisheries policy was considered "remote and piecemeal,"’’" indeed a 
"failure,"’' by provincial politicians. In the same context. Corky 
Evans cited "mismanagement from 5000 kilometers away,"’"' and 
proclaimed that the "made in Ottawa approach is killing jobs"’"'" 
Finally, Norman Ruff notes "the reason the province started to get 
involved was because the feds gave the impression that they could 
not adequately administer the fishery on both sides of the 
country." '
OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR CLARK' S TRANSGOVERNMENTAL FISHERIES POLICY
The above comments and the previous analysis revealed that 
increased interest and declined confidence were central determinants 
of BC's international behaviour surrounding the PST issue. Again, 
these motivations fit neatly with existing explanations for 
provincial international behaviour. This being said, however, it is 
important to consider the possibility that other factors may have 
also influenced BC's transgovernmental stance on the salmon treaty. 
Indeed, it is apparent that there were other factors. Most notable 
in this regard is that the provincial government was motivated by
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the "political context" outside the fisheries arena, and also by the 
"symbolism" that surrounds the Pacific salmon resource. The next 
section will assess the significance of these factors.
POLITICAL CONTEXT: A STRATEGY OF DIVERSION
Early in Premier Clark's mandate it appeared that there were 
adequate reasons to make "politics" of the fishery issue. This 
occurred largely as part of an effort to divert public attention 
away from negative issues affecting the administration. One reason 
for diverting attention came shortly after the 1996 provincial 
election. During the 1996 campaign Clark's NDP party claimed that 
the provincial budget was balanced. After the election, however, 
concerns were raised that this claim was false."'" .Allegations arose 
that the NDP cabinet had conveniently ignored otherwise reliable 
advice ifrom the Treasury Board's fiscal and economic analysis 
branch) indicating chat the budget numbers would be drastically off 
mark - a move purportedly done to maintain the positive electoral 
rapport that eventually carried them to victory."'’ The criticisms 
that befell the government as a result of this revelation were 
significant, especially after it was revealed that a sizable portion 
of voters would not have supported the NDP had they known beforehand 
that the budget numbers were deficient."''
Later, another event emerged to detract from the government's
overall popularity: the "Jobs and Timber Accord." On June 19, 1997,
the Clark government announced that it was launching this program in
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an effort to create 22,400 new direct forest jobs by the end of 
2001.’" Less than a year later, though, it was revealed that 
instead of gaining jobs, employment in this sector had actually 
declined by 12,680 jobs.’"" Significant public outcry followed, and 
the Jobs and Timber Accord was called a "dismal failure"’"' and 
"bogus."’" Thus, between this matter and the aforementioned 
improprieties surrounding the provincial budget, there existed 
considerable motivation for the Clark government to pursue a 
proactive stance on the salmon treaty issue, and thereby deflect 
popular attention in a more favorable direction.
The literature suggests that BC's stance on the PST could have 
been at least partially motivated by a need to divert attention away 
from negative public sentiment. Donald Blake asserts BC 
governments have been inclined to "make political capital" by 
"visiting the sins" of the federal government against the 
province.’"' Indeed, "fed bashing" has proven to be a useful tactic 
when it comes to advancing/defending provincial interests within the 
Canadian State.’’' By doing battle with federal authorities, 
provincial governments can achieve much in terms of reward. For 
example, if some issue, event, or occurrence has had a negative 
effect on the popularity of the provincial government, then taking 
steps that "prey on and activate regional sentiments" can serve to 
deflect the corresponding "internally divisive sentiments onto an 
external enemv."’"''
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Clark's strategy of diversion may also have been reinforced by 
the fact that provincial leaders often stand to gain popularity 
points by acting defiantly against Ottawa. Garth Stevenson notes 
"provincial premiers often have no strong incentive" to be 
cooperative and "may even gain popularity by being as unreasonable 
and intransigent as possible."’'"’ Indeed, occasional provincial 
intrusions into federal jurisdiction are thought to be politically 
valuable for premiers who are willing to display concern for issues 
that adversely affect their province's interests.’"'
In assessing the political context behind BC's stance on the PST 
we must also reflect upon the "electoral" issues surrounding the new 
Clark government. Reference here is to the NDP strategy meeting 
held in February 1996. To reiterate, when Glen Clark became Premier 
shortly before the i996 election he took charge of a government 
facing an unreceptive electorate. Consequently, the government was 
desperate to devise a plan that would improve its popularity. Part 
of the strategy eventually arrived at involved the pursuit of a 
fisheries policy based upon the government's emergent interest (and 
investment) in the salmon resource, and its reduced confidence in 
Ottawa's administration of the fishery. By using this combination 
as the foundation of an aggressive, transgovernmental approach to 
the PST impasse, it was posited that the new premier could pursue 
the issue in a "politically-beneficial manner."’"' In essence, Clark 
could address Ottawa's shortcomings pertaining to the fishery,
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defend the provincial interest, and, by doing so, help improve the 
popularity of his government going into the provincial election.
SALMON & SYMBOLISM
In assessing BC's stance on the PST issue and the motivations 
behind its transgovernmental fisheries policy, we cannot discount 
the important, symbolic role salmon assume in the political culture 
of the province.’' Because symbolism affects and influences 
understandings of provincial identity, which in turn shapes 
conceptualizations of specific regional "interests," this must be 
considered an implicit, background variable that affects 
understandings of the "provincial interest" (albeit not as acutely 
as the environmental factor does).
The use of symbolism is not unprecedented in the development of 
provincial policy. As Walter Young and Terence Morley observe, 
former premier W.A.C. Bennett also recognized "the importance of 
overt symbols in establishing a sense of provincial pride and 
loyalty - a loyalty that would also enhance his authority as the 
head of government."’'
Indeed, the notion of taking political action on the PST can in 
part be explained by the symbolism that exists between these fish 
and BC identity. Pacific salmon have been described as being 
"closely related to the aspirations and beliefs of the people who 
surround them,"’'' and, in this sense, are "enormously important in
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the social and cultural life of their home territory."’ As Geoff 
Meggs explains, British Columbians "see salmon as our common 
heritage and a symbol of our apparently inexhaustible natural 
wealth."’ '■ This observation is validated by Norman Ruff, who 
states, that BC's position on the PST issue was influenced by the 
fact that "there is something very symbolic about salmon and BC's 
identity as a resource province."’' This theme was evident when, in 
1998, BC's Job Protection Commissioner reported on the challenges 
facing the salmon fishing industry:
Salmon are special to British Columbians. Beyond their 
economic importance salmon are part of the intrinsic 
identity of our province, admired by those who live 
here and those who visit from somewhere else ... 
salmon and the people, businesses, and communities 
that depend upon them, are a rich part of our cultural 
heritage and psyche.’ '
This theme also resonated with Clark. For example, he stated 
that Pacific salmon are "a symbol of our province's riches and . . . 
strong environmental stewardship."’’ He also acknowledged that his 
belief that "wild Pacific salmon are a powerful symbol to British 
Columbians" influenced his desire to pursue the PST matter,’' and 
that this issue could serve as something that could define his 
government.' Thus, the s\Tnbolic elements of the salmon resource 
must be taken into consideration when assessing BC's "interest" in 
the PST issue.
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CHAPTER 7 -  CONCLUSION
In the beginning, this case study of the BC government's policy 
on the PST set out to test and explain the importance of two 
factors in shaping the province's transgovernmental stance on this 
issue: increased "interest" and decreased "confidence." In 
Chapter 2 a review of the theoretical literature on 
transgovernmentalism identified these as dominant variables 
explaining provincial transgovernmental behaviour. The increased 
"interest" factor was then discussed in Chapter Three, in this 
case involving the establishment of a provincial environmental 
protection regime between 1991 and 1996. Much of this regime 
insulated salmon habitat from the adverse effects of economic 
development, and thus elevated the "provincial interest" in the 
salmon treaty. The declined "confidence" factor was then 
addressed in Chapter Four, through a narration of the forces 
behind the wearing away of BC's confidence in Ottawa's ability to 
manage the west coast salmon fishery. These forces included a 
long series of controversial DFO policy initiatives; Ottawa's 
persistent failure ro reel-in American overfishing of Canadian 
salmon in the absence of a workable PST agreement; a poorly 
contrived aboriginal fisheries strategy; and a controversial fleet 
restructuring initiative. Ultimately, it was shown that the 
increased interest and declined confidence factors created a 
situation that invited provincial international action to resolve 
the PST affair. By showing that these factors assumed a central
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role in determining the province's PST stance, we have-validated 
existing theoretical explanations for independent provincial 
activity.
However, this study goes further than just affirming the 
usefulness of current theories regarding the sources of 
transgovernmentalism. It also exposes the need to address other 
factors. These include the "'political context," such as the need 
to divert public attention away from domestic issues outside of 
the fisheries realm (issues that were negatively affecting the 
popularity of the Clark government), as well as the government's 
desire to improve its popularity (and electoral prospects). Other 
factors include "symbolism" & "culture," specifically the role 
salmon assume in shaping conceptualizations of the provincial 
culture and identity iwhich in turn shape understandings of the 
provincial interest) . Neither the symbolism/culture or political 
context factors are highlighted in existing explanations of 
provincial transgovernmentalism. Figure 2 (below) is a revised 
version of the original hypothetical model, and includes the added 
factors.
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FIGURE 2 - REVISED HYPOTHETICAL MODEL
I n p u t :  i n d e p e n d e n t  F a c t o r s O u t p u t :  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e
B C ’s
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Thus, to reiterate, this thesis has demonstrated that current 
transgovernmental theory is a useful tool for assessing and 
accounting for sources of provincial transgovernmental activity. 
This affirmation of the utility of the theory is complemented by 
insights into other possible sources of transgovernmentalism, 
specifically political context and symbolism/culture. It thereby 
reveals a need to expand transgovernmental theory. The academic 
contribution of this analysis is that it will allow students of 
politics to apply transgovernmental theory more usefully to 
explain provincial international activism. This analysis 
underscores the importance of incorporating factors relating to 
political context and symbolism/culture when conducting analyses 
of transoovernmental activitv.
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APPENDIX A -  MAPS
MAP 1 -  GENERAL MIGRATORY PATTERN OF PACIFIC SALMON'
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MAP 2 -  RETURN MIGRATION PATTERN OF PACIFIC SALMON^
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APPENDIX B -  INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
Note: Permission to be quoted was freely granted by the subjects of each 
of the following interviews.
AUTHOR'S INTERVIEW WITH GLEN CLARK (JANUARY 10, 2001).
Question 1 :
To what extent would you say that your government's proactivity on 
the Pacific Salmon Treaty was a conscious attempt to build on the 
existing environmental protection initiatives established by NDP 
governments over the 1990s?
Response :
"It was a logical extension of our environmental policies to protect 
salmon from both Ottawa's incompetence and the Americans' disregard 
for a legitimate international agreement. Really, though, the 
previous NDP Premier did not aggressively pursue the salmon treaty, 
and at that time our policy on the Treaty was largely driven by the 
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. In fact, most 
provincial politicians thought it was foolish to be involved in what 
was a complicated, no-win, federal issue."
Question 2:
In terms of electoral support the UFAWU and fishery dependent 
communities are well known to be allegiant to the NDP. To what 
degree did this reality factor into your government's decision to 
pursue a proactive fisheries policy?
Response :
"There is no question that the fact that fishery-dependent 
communities voted NDP was a motivating influence on me. It is my 
strong, long-held view that the province has an obligation to defend 
workers and coastal communities. I also believe that wild Pacific 
salmon are a powerful symbol to British Columbians, and this 
strengthened my resolve on the matter."
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Question 3:
Throughout the early to mid 1990s the federal government (DFO) 
received considerable public criticism for being ineffective in 
terms of its fisheries policies. Would you say that it was a 
conscious move on behalf of your government to capitalize on these 
federal shortcomings by touting BC's fish-protection initiatives and 
taking a more autonomous stance on the PST issue?
Response :
"I do share the view that the federal government cared little about 
BC fisheries and that their record had been a bad one. For these 
reasons I felt BC should play a greater role in managing its 
fisheries. I also felt that if jurisdiction were moved to the 
province and if this were part of future constitutional discussion 
it might have encouraged BC to be more generous to other regions of 
the councry."
Question 4 :
Given (1) Ottawa's poor record on fisheries policy, and (2) the pre- 
existence of a slate of NDP fish-protection/environmental policies, 
would you agree that it made sense (in political terms) for your 
government to link these issues and chart an independent stance on 
the PST issue?
Response :
"It was clear to me that it was good politics for us to connect 
these issues and pursue the PST, and I believed it was something 
that could define my government. My motivation was also to induce 
change for the west coast fishery, to help reverse the decline of 
coastal communities, and to stand up for British Columbia. "
Question 4 :
Did David Zirnhelt suggest to you in 1995 that the PST was issue an 
issue that you, as Premier, could "run with" and (profitably) 
elevate in terms of the government's priorities?
Response :
"Yes, Dave did suggest that I handle the file, and he remained very
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supportive of my doing so."
Question 5:
Would you say, at the time, that your stance on the PST issue 
amounted to a "no lose" situation for the province?
Response :
"I think initially the issue was politically "no lose," but, because 
of our aggressiveness and because of my high level of involvement, 
it became more of a loser politically when we weren't successful.
Of course, the real losers were coastal communities."
AUTHOR'S INTERVIEW WITH DAVID ANDERSON (JANUARY 11, 2001). 
Question 1 :
What impact did Clark's anti-Ottawa, anti-American stance on the PST 
issue have on the negotiations over the PST impasse?
Response :
"Negotiations with the Americans were actually rather amicable, save 
for Clark's approach. Clark had an inability to understand that 
pulling out of negotiations was a step far backwards. Given that the 
BC NDP were aligned with integral Canadian fishing interests - 
commercial interests - I wanted that representation at the table.
The province's stance on the PST was an ideological one .. Ideology 
in negotiations predisposes an unaccommodative approach, and 
negotiations are an exercise of diplomatic compromise."
Question 2:
Was there any benefit derived from Clark's aggressive stance? 
Response :
"Actually, despite the antics, I do rather like Glen and I admire 
his principles on the issue. He fell into the role of good cop/bad 
cop, and the province's position did clarify many of the issues at 
stake. But, ultimately, he overplayed his hand."
114
Qaestion 3:
What are your thoughts on the province's use of the Nanoose facility 
as a bargaining chip against the Americans?
I Response :
I "It was ridiculous. You simply cannot link issues - particularly
I defense issues - against the Americans. Of course in Ottawa we knew
j this was a severely counterproductive measure, and that's why in rhe
; end we had to expropriate. The province's approach was amateurish
and they could not see the broader problems associated with their
i
I position."
AUTHOR'S INTERVIEW WITH NORMAN RUFF PROFESSOR OF POLITCIAL SCIENCE, 
UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA (JUNE 3, 1998) .
Question 1:
How would you characterize BC's emergent stance on the Pacific 
Salmon Treaty?
Response :
"Well, the BC government's fisheries policy is now being directly- 
driven by the premier's office, and he has stacked the premier's 
office with fisheries experts. For the time being it would seem 
that Clark is essentially the Minister of Fisheries for this 
province."
Question 2:
Why do you think the province has attempted to elevate its role in 
the PST issue?
Response :
"A large part of the reason the province started to get involved was 
because the feds gave the impression that they could not adequately 
administer the fishery on both sides of the country. This lack of 
confidence, along with the fact that there has been an obvious lack 
of progress on the PST, has resulted in BC not being content to 
allow Ottawa the privilege of quiet diplomacy in dealing with the 
Americans on the Treaty. One should also remember that there is
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also something very symbolic about salmon and the BC's identity as a 
resource province."
Qaestion 3:
Would you say that Clark is trying to get further utility out of the 
previous government's environmental regime?
Response :
"One must bear in mind that Clark is not Harcourt - he is not an 
environmentalist. Regardless, he is more than happy to build his 
fisheries policy upon Mike's [Harcourt] environmental programs."
Question 3:
Would you agree that BC's stance on the PST amounts to 
transgovernmentalism?
Response ?
"Yes, quite clearly."
RELEVANT QUOTES FROM AUTHOR'S DISCUSSION (JUNE 5, 1998) WITH STUART 
CULBERTSON, FORMER ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, 
FISHERIES & FOOD, AND BC FISHERIES SECRETARIAT.
Re: Linkages between salmon and habitat:
"Habitat, habitat, habitat is to salmon what location, location, 
location is to real estate speculators."
Re: The role of salmon habitat issues in shaping the content of the 
CORE process and Protected Areas Strategy:
"Throughout the decision-making process concerns relating to salmon 
habitat were of paramount importance."
RE: The transition from Brian Tobin to Fred Mifflin as federal 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans:
"Before Mifflin, there was a good working relationship between Tobin 
and Zirnhelt. Unlike Mifflin, Tobin was not afraid to defend BC's 
interests."
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RE: Tbs iaitial slsvatxoD of tbs PST as a policy issus for tbs 
provincs :
"It was Dave (Zirnhelt) who first really pursued this matter and got 
this issue and our approaches to the PST up and running."
RE: Coordinating: sxisting^ snvirozuasntal policiss into one, cohssivs 
provincial fisbsriss stratsgy:
"We suddenly realized that we had a collage of policies designed - 
in various shapes and forms - to preserve salmon habitat. We thought 
it might be expedient, from a purely provincial perspective, to 
combine these into a coordinated plan."
RE: Cbristopbsr Bssby and tbs failsd asdiation procsss :
"He was sc frustrated that the US wouldn't heed his advice, he 
quit."
RELEVANT QUOTES FROM AUTHOR'S DISCUSSION WITH BILL LAFEAUX- 
VALENTINE, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FISHERIES (JUNE 24, 1998) .
RE: BC's invsstmsnts in protscting fisb babitat.
"In terms of quality, the trees being protected from logging in the 
name of salmon habitat tend to be much more valuable than trees 
found in areas that are less integral to fish habitat. Protecting 
salmon habitat therefore represents a considerable economic 
investment on behalf of the provincial government."
RE: PST Nsgotiations.
"Ottawa did not seem prepared to take the necessary measures to 
bring the Americans into compliance with the PST agreement."
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RELEVANT QUOTES FRCM AUTHOR'S DISCUSSION WITH DAVID ZIRNHELT, FORMER 
BC MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES, AND FOOD (JUNE 5, 1998) . 
RE: Bringing' the PST Issue to the Premier's attention:
"I realized we had an issue of some substance and utility here, one 
that we could possibly appropriate in a politically-beneficial 
manner. I explained to Glen that this was something that he could 
run with. This was the first time the matter was discussed at that 
level, in the premier's office, in an explicitly strategic context."
RE: BC's relationship vith Ottava on the PST issue while Brian Tobin 
vas the federal fisheries minister:
"I felt that Tobin was not afraid to deviate from the broader 
objectives of the federal government in order to protect BC's 
interests. He appeared to take pride in countering the Americans. In 
one instance the Department of Foreign Affairs tried to exclude BC 
representatives from attending meetings with American 
representatives, and he went against their wishes by insisting that 
we be present at the table. All in all, I felt we had a solid 
working relationship with Tobin, and that was key to keeping things 
together."
RE: BC's relationship vith Ottava after Brian Tobin vas replaced by 
Fred Mifflin as the federal fisheries minister :
"Mifflin quickly showed us that he had a remote and piecemeal 
approach to fisheries management. He developed a reputation of 
thinking that British Columbia consisted solely of the 10 square 
miles around the Vancouver airport. Mifflin became notorious for 
landing at Vancouver International, giving a 20-minute speech, then 
flying back east immediately afterward. Now if that isn't turning a 
cold shoulder I don't know what is. Then, at the beginning of '96 
there were indications that he was going to take drastic measures to 
reorganize the pacific fishery. This exacerbated our concerns over 
both his and Ottawa's direction."
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